Computer underground Digest Wed May 25, 1994 Volume 6 : Issue 45 ISSN 1004-042X Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET) Archivist: Brendan Kehoe Retiring Shadow Archivist: Stanton McCandlish Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala Ian Dickinson Covey Editors: D. Bannaducci & S. Jones CONTENTS, #6.45 (May 25, 1994) File 1--The Net Strikes Back (Greencard Spamming reprint) File 2--Netcom cancels Canter's Account (fwd) File 3--What is Spamming? (fwd) File 4--Fidonet Crackdown in Italy - Follow-up (24 May '94) File 5--PGP 2.6 IS NOW AVAILABLE! File 6--Re: CuD 6.43 - Response to Skulason File 7--Re: File 2--Re: CuD 6.42 (Response to Review of Anti-Virus Book) File 8--In Re CuD 6.43, Possible "Court Fraud" twist in AA Case File 9--Ontario Provincial Police harass Internet Users File 10--RSI Network Newsletter File 11--Special Issue on Electronic Communication and Sociology Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are available at no cost electronically. CuD is available as a Usenet newsgroup: comp.society.cu-digest Or, to subscribe, send a one-line message: SUB CUDIGEST your name Send it to LISTSERV@UIUCVMD.BITNET or LISTSERV@VMD.CSO.UIUC.EDU The editors may be contacted by voice (815-753-0303), fax (815-753-6302) or U.S. mail at: Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL 60115, USA. Issues of CuD can also be found in the Usenet comp.society.cu-digest news group; on CompuServe in DL0 and DL4 of the IBMBBS SIG, DL1 of LAWSIG, and DL1 of TELECOM; on GEnie in the PF*NPC RT libraries and in the VIRUS/SECURITY library; from America Online in the PC Telecom forum under "computing newsletters;" On Delphi in the General Discussion database of the Internet SIG; on RIPCO BBS (312) 528-5020 (and via Ripco on internet); and on Rune Stone BBS (IIRGWHQ) (203) 832-8441. CuD is also available via Fidonet File Request from 1:11/70; unlisted nodes and points welcome. UNITED STATES: etext.archive.umich.edu (141.211.164.18) in /pub/CuD/ ftp.eff.org (192.88.144.4) in /pub/Publications/CuD aql.gatech.edu (128.61.10.53) in /pub/eff/cud/ world.std.com in /src/wuarchive/doc/EFF/Publications/CuD/ uceng.uc.edu in /pub/wuarchive/doc/EFF/Publications/CuD/ wuarchive.wustl.edu in /doc/EFF/Publications/CuD/ EUROPE: nic.funet.fi in pub/doc/cud/ (Finland) ftp.warwick.ac.uk in pub/cud/ (United Kingdom) JAPAN: ftp.glocom.ac.jp /mirror/ftp.eff.org/ COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of diverse views. CuD material may be reprinted for non-profit as long as the source is cited. Authors hold a presumptive copyright, and they should be contacted for reprint permission. It is assumed that non-personal mail to the moderators may be reprinted unless otherwise specified. Readers are encouraged to submit reasoned articles relating to computer culture and communication. Articles are preferred to short responses. Please avoid quoting previous posts unless absolutely necessary. DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent the views of the moderators. Digest contributors assume all responsibility for ensuring that articles submitted do not violate copyright protections. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 24 May 1994 13:50:31 -0700 From: hlr@WELL.SF.CA.US(Howard Rheingold) Subject: File 1--The Net Strikes Back (Greencard Spamming reprint) The Net Strikes Back by Howard Rheingold Originally published as a "Tomorrow" column in the San Francisco Examiner. How should Internet citizens respond when ambitious entrepreneurs violate the Net's unwritten rules of conduct? The question arose recently when two Arizona lawyers indiscriminately posted advertisements to thousands of inappropriate online forums -- a gross breach of Netiquette known as "spamming." Can the Net defend itself against practices such as spamming without endangering the freedom of expression that has made this global electronic forum valuable? Some Netheads responded to the lawyers' ad barrage with guerilla tactics, "flaming" the spammers -- jamming their electronic mailboxes with impolite notes. A minority of zealots suggested "fax-bombing" the perpetrators' office -- sending endless loops of black paper faxes to the attorneys' advertised fax number. But the proposed punishment that won the widest favor was one that seemed to best fit the "crime:" Netizens were urged to e-mail the two lawyers and ask for information about their business by paper mail. If enough polite but bogus requests were blasted back at the spammers, these Net users reasoned, then perhaps the price of finding one paying client would be raised too high. But in the end, the most effective way of safeguarding the Net's democratic code is neither guerilla war not the tyranny of rules. Under the banner of "tools, not rules," some Usenet enthusiasts have created computer programs to deal with online boors. A "kill-file" can cause anything written by specified person to be discarded without viewing; the messages will arrive at your computer community, and others can choose to read them, but they won't be shown to you as an option when you check different conversations (known as newsgroups) for new postings. If a pushy salesman wants to crash a communal conversation about health care reform or Haiti, the 16,000 people involved in that mass conversation can put the offender's electronic address in their kill files, and postings from the offending electronic address will no longer be displayed on their computers. On Usenet, nobody can stop you from spouting any kind of nonsense, but anybody can make you disappear from his or her own screen. Using the available tools to bar unwelcome solicitors is far easier than limiting freedom of expression on the Net -- it's also morally preferable. Some people are now talking about filtering out all Usenet messages sent by known spammers to entire computer communities on the network. This mass screening would spare hundreds of Usenet participants in each of those communities the trouble of listing the spammer in their personal kill files. It would be easy for computers on the Net to identify accounts that broadcast large amounts of messages to abnormally large numbers of newsgroups, and alert other communities instantly. Attention is the currency of cyberspace. If spammers learn that the Net will demonstrate its disapproval and turn off its attention in an organized manner, maybe they'll go away before they damage the cybernetic commons. The attack of the spammers is probably just the first of many coming collisions between human greed and common courtesy on the Net. We need to get better at building computer tools and social contracts that deal with such problems without entangling ourselves in rules and regulations. ### Howard Rheingold hlr@well.sf.ca.us Millennium Whole Earth Catalog 27 Gate Five Road * Sausalito, CA 94965 * Vox 415 332 1716 * Fax 415 332 3110 ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 24 May 1994 18:22:29 -0400 (EDT) From: Stanton McCandlish Subject: File 2--Netcom cancels Canter's Account (fwd) Date--Fri, 20 May 1994 17:53:37 -0700 (PDT) >From--Glee Harrah Cady Subject: File 3--What is Spamming? (fwd) In reply to the question "What is Spamming: Spamming is sending out junk mail to a large number of newsgroups or lists. Recent examples of spam include the infamous Cantor & Siegel Green Card posting (5000+ newsgroups), Taford's Investment Opportunities (a piker at a mere 200 or so lists), and the above-mentioned Skinny Dip (all the alt.* and comp.* groups, at last count). The use of the word "spam" in this context has its origin in a Monty Python skit. (Spam (tm) occupies a significant place in Python symbology.) Downloaded from alt.fan.monty-python: From--djaffe@mirna.together.uvm.edu (Douglas Jaffe) Subject--Re--Need Spam script Steve McGrew (stevem@comtch.iea.com) wrote: : Could someone either post or mail me the script to the Spam skit? Thanks. : -- : Brian the Half a Lumberjack The Spam Sketch from the second series of "Monty Python's Flying Circus" and "Monty Python's Previous Record" (Spam = Spiced Pork And Ham, a sort of cheap luncheon meat) Scene: A cafe. One table is occupied by a group of Vikings with horned helmets on. A man and his wife enter. Man (Eric Idle): You sit here, dear. Wife (Graham Chapman in drag): All right. Man (to Waitress): Morning! Waitress (Terry Jones, in drag as a bit of a rat-bag): Morning! Man: Well, what've you got? Waitress: Well, there's egg and bacon; egg sausage and bacon; egg and spam; egg bacon and spam; egg bacon sausage and spam; spam bacon sausage and spam; spam egg spam spam bacon and spam; spam sausage spam spam bacon spam tomato and spam; Vikings (starting to chant): Spam spam spam spam... Waitress: ...spam spam spam egg and spam; spam spam spam spam spam spam baked beans spam spam spam... Vikings (singing): Spam! Lovely spam! Lovely spam! Waitress: ...or Lobster Thermidor a Crevette with a mornay sauce served in a Provencale manner with shallots and aubergines garnished with truffle pate, brandy and with a fried egg on top and spam. Wife: Have you got anything without spam? Waitress: Well, there's spam egg sausage and spam, that's not got much spam in it. Wife: I don't want ANY spam! Man: Why can't she have egg bacon spam and sausage? Wife: THAT'S got spam in it! Man: Hasn't got as much spam in it as spam egg sausage and spam, has it? Vikings: Spam spam spam spam (crescendo through next few lines) Wife: Could you do the egg bacon spam and sausage without the spam then? Waitress: Urgghh! Wife: What do you mean 'Urgghh'? I don't like spam! Vikings: Lovely spam! Wonderful spam!) Waitress: Shut up! Vikings: Lovely spam! Wonderful spam! Waitress: Shut up! (Vikings stop) Bloody Vikings! You can't have egg bacon spam and sausage without the spam. Wife (shrieks): I don't like spam! Man: Sshh, dear, don't cause a fuss. I'll have your spam. I love it. I'm having spam spam spam spam spam spam spam beaked beans spam spam spam and spam! Vikings (singing): Spam spam spam spam. Lovely spam! Wonderful spam! Waitress: Shut up!! Baked beans are off. Man: Well could I have her spam instead of the baked beans then? Waitress: You mean spam spam spam spam spam spam... (but it is too late and the Vikings drown her words) Vikings (singing elaborately): Spam spam spam spam. Lovely spam! Wonderful spam! Spam spa-a-a-a-a-am spam spa-a-a-a-a-am spam. Lovely spam! Lovely spam! Lovely spam! Lovely spam! Lovely spam! Spam spam spam spam! __ djaffe@mirna.together.uvm.edu For more on spamming, check out alt.current-events.net-abuse and/or news.admin.misc. ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 24 May 1994 18:18:19 PDT From: Bernardo Parrella Subject: File 4--Fidonet Crackdown in Italy - Follow-up (24 May '94) "The crackdown needed to be done, software piracy has become a National sport in Italy. Unfortunately, the operation rapidly became too wide for our forces: right now, here in Pesaro we are only three Prosecutors, quite busy with penal trials, in court all day long. We will try to do our best with the less possible damage for the entire community." Here are the explanatory words of Gaetano Savoldelli Pedrocchi, the Pesaro Prosecutor who is managing the investigations that last week led to a nationwide crackdown on Fidonet Italia BBSes During the operation - confidentially known as "Hardware 1" - more than 60 (some sources go up to 130) Bulletin Board Systems have been visited and searched by police officials. In the central and northern part of the country, several Fidonet nodes were closed and dozens of operators were charged of "conspiracy with unknown for distribution of illegally copied software and appropriation of secret passwords." Some figures say the seizures included more than 120 computers, 300 streamer-cassettes and CD-ROMs, 60,000 floppy disks, an imprecise number of modems and other electronic devices. In some cases, police officials sealed off rooms and garages where the BBSes were operated or closed all the hardware they found in a closet. Several Fidonet operators (generally students, professionals, small-company owners) lost their personal data because every magnetic support was "suspected to carry pirated software". Aimed to crack a distribution ring of illegal software run by two people using the publicly available Fidonet nodelist, investigators searched and seized every single site of the list - even those that had never had any contact with the two suspected. Also, many operators not inquired by police were forced to immediately shut down their systems, searching for possible illegal software covertly uploaded on their BBSes. As a consequence of such indiscriminate operations, the real, very few pirate boards had the chance to quickly hide their businesses - sources say. "I do not believe to this scenario," said the Pesaro Prosecutor in an interview by SottoVoce Magazine. "We acted after precise information about the activities of a specific data-bank: if some operators have nothing to do with the charges, we'll verify it as soon as possible." Questioned about further investigations against BBSes users, the Prosecutor said: "We'll see later....at the present, users can sleep peacefully: otherwise, I cannot imagine how many people should be investigated. I do not want to criminalize the entire population. Even if the inquiry has become so vast, this is not a subject of vital importance for our country. It is mostly a fiscal and bureaucratic issue, a matter of small-scale but spread illegality." However, rumors say other inquires are currently underway in other cities, and even the Criminalpol is working on similar issues. Assisting the investigated people, some lawyers already asked for the immediate return of the confiscated materials, while others suggested to wait for better times. In any case, it will probably take months (years?) before receiving official answers regarding the seizures. Struggling to re-open in some way their systems, Fidonet operators are also working to get the attention of mainstream media on the issue - with little success, so far. After an article published by La Repubblica, two local newspapers, Il Mattino and Il Giornale di Brescia, run brief reports on May 15, both centered on "a wide software piracy ring cracked by police officials". But the real activity is happening inside and around electronic communities. MC-Link and especially Agora' Telematica (the biggest Italian systems) are doing a great job, offering space for news, opinions and comments - also acting as connection links between the decimated net of BBSes and worried individuals scattered in the country. Here is just one example: "....police officials seized everything, including three PCs (one broken), a couple of modem (just fixed for some friends), floppies, phone cables, phone-books. Now Dark Moon is off, hoping to have at least one line available in a few days, maybe at 2400. I fear that more raids will soon follow elsewhere. So, please, stay alert..." A catching dynamism flourishes from the BBSes linked to Cybernet. Although some of them are currently not operating, a special issue of the Corriere Telematico was just released over the net and their printed voice, Decoder Magazine, will soon distribute news, testimonies, comments on "Operation Hardware 1". PeaceLink has set up a defense committee-news center in Taranto and its spokesperson, Alessandro Marescotti, will sign an article for the next issue of the weekly magazine Avvenimenti. Promptly alerted, the International online community gave good response - quickly redistributing the news over the Net and sending supportive messages. Michael Baker, Chairman of Electronic Frontiers Australia, sent this email: "To that end I am writing to offer assistance to anyone in Italy who wants to set up such an organisation. Recently I (along with others) have set up Electronic Frontiers Australia, and I am now its Chairman. Other national EF groups have been, or are being, set up in several other countries (Canada, Ireland, Norway, UK and Japan)....if there is anything we can do to help, please ask." Shifting toward politics, on May 19, the first working day of the new Italian Cabinet, six Members of the Reformers group presented a written question to the Ministers of Justice and Interior. After a short introduction about telecom systems, the document gives an account of the facts and asks three final questions to the Government: "- if it will intend to open an investigation to verify if the raids ordered by the Pesaro Prosecutor's office were prejudicial to the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression; - if it is not the case to set up a better and greater team of computer experts in order to avoid further random seizures of electronic devices that lead to shut down the BBSes; - if it is not the occasion to confirm that current legislation does not charge system operators with objective responsibility for users' activities on telecom systems." Although the Fidonet sysops community (about 300 people) is still quite uncertain regarding its future, many of them feel the urgent need to overcome a sort of cultural and social isolation that clearly surrounds the telecom scene in Italy. At the moment the main issue is how to raise public interest and political pressure to obtain clear laws in support of civil rights in the electronic medium. Ideas and proposals are developing from several electronic laboratories, such as the Community Networking conference on Agora' Telematica. "We underestimate our strength: if we could just be able to set up an Italian Association of Telecom Users we could put pressure on political and legislative bodies." "We must attract common people, through hundreds of tables and events in the streets more than online, even if we do not have a Kapor to support us." "What about a 24-hours silence from any system in the country with simultaneous events in each city and village where a BBS operates?" The situation is rather fluid and in motion. Stay connect! - Bernardo Parrella electronic distribution of this posting is greatly encouraged, preserving its original version, including the header and this notice ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 24 May 1994 12:17:43 -0700 From: Tommy the Tourist Subject: File 5--PGP 2.6 IS NOW AVAILABLE! +---------- Forwarded message ---------- _MIT PGP Release_ PGP 2.6 IS NOW AVAILABLE! -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- MIT is pleased to announce the release of PGP 2.6, a free public-key encryption program for non-commercial use. PGP 2.6 provides for digital signatures and confidentiality of files and messages. PGP 2.6 is distributed in source form for all platforms. For convenience, an MSDOS executable is also part of this release. Because source is available, anyone may examine it to verify the program's integrity. PGP 2.6 uses the RSAREF(TM) Cryptographic Toolkit, supplied by RSA Data Security, Inc. PGP 2.6 is being released by MIT with the cooperation of RSADSI. In order to fully protect RSADSI's intellectual property rights in public-key technology, PGP 2.6 is designed so that the messages it creates after September 1, 1994 will be unreadable by earlier versions of PGP that infringe patents licensed exclusively to Public Key Partners by MIT and Stanford University. PGP 2.6 will continue to be able to read messages generated by those earlier versions. Because earlier versions of PGP (including MIT's Beta test PGP 2.5 release) will not be able to read messages created by PGP 2.6 after September 1, 1994, MIT strongly urges all PGP users to upgrade to the new format. The intent of the format change is to discourage continued use of earlier infringing software in the U.S., and to give people adequate time to upgrade. As part of the release process, MIT commissioned an independent legal review of the intellectual property issues surrounding earlier releases of PGP and PGP keyservers. This review determined that use of PGP 2.3 within the United States infringes a patent licensed by MIT to RSADSI, and that keyservers that primarily accept 2.3 keys are mostly likely contributing to this infringement. For that reason, MIT encourages all non-commercial PGP users in the U.S. to upgrade to PGP 2.6, and all keyserver operators to no longer accept keys that are identified as being produced by PGP 2.3. How to get PGP 2.6 from MIT: PGP 2.6 is available from MIT only over the Internet. Use anonymous FTP to login to net-dist.mit.edu. Login as anonymous. Look in the directory /pub/PGP. In this directory, available to everyone, is a README file a copy of the RSAREF license and a copy of a software license from MIT. Please read the README file and these licenses carefully. Take particular note of the provisions about export control. THe README file contains more detailed instructions on how to get PGP 2.6. Also in /pub/PGP is a copy of the PGP Manual (files pgpdoc1.txt and pgpdoc2.txt) and the file pgformat.doc that describes the PGP message, signature and key formats, including the modifications for PGP 2.6. These are being made available without the distribution restrictions that pertain to the PGP source and executable code. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQBVAgUBLeGAOlUFZvpNDE7hAQG4yQH+PbABiBvnFQU0u084Ed9whx988IaUNpIp Sl4Ab950SChJbewZNvcpQ/yEMjF2wi6PhUx4k3VySUvKmaC6W7rhNQ== =+qTj -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 20 May 94 10:25:57 EDT From: morgan@ENGR.UKY.EDU(Wes Morgan) Subject: File 6--Re: CuD 6.43 - Response to Skulason In CuD 6.43 frisk@COMPLEX.IS(Fridrik Skulason) writes: >The problem is that becoming a virus "expert" five years ago was much, >much, easier than becoming one today... Well, there's a reason for this difficulty that you didn't mention. However, you illustrate this additional problem later in your message: >>What a lot of people don't know is that other public systems have been >>a target of the same people. > >And what is wrong with that ? Public systems that distribute viruses >any way or other are IMHO a part of the virus problem....they are not >serving any useful purpose, and I will not oppose any attempts by >anyone to shut them down. How, then, will new "virus experts" arise? Since I don't have extensive contacts in this particular business, I can only examine the viruses that find their way into our labs. One doesn't learn much from 4 viruses... >I will not actively attempt to shut them down myself, though... I'm glad to see that comment... >Just look at all the anti-virus products that have been withdrawn from >the market, discontinued or just falled hopelessly far behind. On the >other hand, there is not a single good new anti-virus product (written >from scratch, that is) that I am aware of, which has appeared in the >last two years. In the absence of new "virus experts," how will new anti-virus products appear at all? >Simple nonsense. In fact, there is a high degree of co-operation among >most of the companies in the anti-virus industry. That may be true, but there is zero cooperation between the industry and interested parties out in the world. I see this as a close cousin to the general problem in computer security. I'm a good guy - a white hat, if you will - but there is absolutely no way for me to "establish my credentials" within the rather close-knit security groups. Everyone tells me, "go to conferences, publish papers, and things will open up to you." Well, folks, that isn't an option for most of us; I don't have the money to go to conferences, and I don't have a prayer of publishing a paper until I can get my hands on research ma- terial. It's a textbook case of Catch-22...and a lot of *good* people are chafing under it. (Heck, one vendor wouldn't even give me an update on a bug that *I* reported!) Please don't misunderstand me. I'm *extremely* grateful for the efforts put forth by the anti-virus industry. It's just that I'd like to learn more - and, perhaps, even contribute something back - and I can't even get my foot in the *$&^%(#(# door. ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 20 May 1994 10:34:58 -0500 From: Jason Zions Subject: File 7--Re: File 2--Re: CuD 6.42 (Response to Review of Anti-Virus Book ) >>For example: >>"It would be difficult to create more [virus] experts, because the >>learning curve is very shallow. The first time you disassemble >>something like Jerusalem virus, it takes a week. After you've done a >>few hundred viruses, you could whip through something as simple as >>Jerusalem in 15 minutes." > >Well, this may not make sense to you, but nevertheless it is pretty >accurate. Not in the English language it's not; it's still nonsense. A shallow learning curve would make it easier to become a virus expert, not more difficult. >simply because the number of viruses is so much greater, and because of the >"advances" in virus development during the past few years. If the advances are so great as to render old methods for understanding them obsolete, then a current expert (e.g. you) and a newcomer have exactly the same learning curve to climb. If the advance is not so great, then a newcomer, having climbed the original learning curve, has the same incremental distance to climb as you. I assert that changes in the world of Physics have been far more complex and been far more paradigm-shattering than anything in the virus world, and yet we still turn out physicists by the hundreds. > Public systems that distribute viruses >any way or other are IMHO a part of the virus problem....they are not >serving any useful purpose, and I will not oppose any attempts by >anyone to shut them down. It has been suggested that one of the purposes such public virus repositories provide is one of education; that is, newcomers to the anti-virus world have a place to grab examples of viruses to disassemble. Do you disagree with that purpose? >>"It's my opinion, most >>of these kinds of things are really attempts to keep access to >>information from competitors." > >Simple nonsense. In fact, there is a high degree of co-operation among >most of the companies in the anti-virus industry. One of the main >functions of CARO is to share information - in particular virus >samples, but also useful technical information. For example, earlier >this month there was considerable discussion on the detection of the >two SMEG viruses that have just been reported in the UK. Ah; it's an oligopoly, then. A small number of putative competitors restrict information to themselves as a barrier to competition. If the conspiracy theorists are correct, that small number of competitors also create and distribute enough "new" viruses to keep the learning curve high for someone not already a member of the club. This is, of course, merely a conspiracy theory; I do not assert that this is so. ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 20 May 1994 18:31:53 -0400 (ADT) From: The Advocate Subject: File 8--In Re CuD 6.43, Possible "Court Fraud" in AA Case In CuD 6.43, hkhenson@CUP.PORTAL.COM writes: >To bring you up to date, I uncovered evidence of outright fraud on the >court system, and brought it to the attention of the FBI two weeks >ago. It involved the San Francisco US Attorney who unilatterally took >a motion off a judge's calendar after it had been placed there by a >court clerk. > >I presented court records to the FBI agent which clearly showed the >problem. The agent claimed to be absolutely baffled. He admitted >that I had shown clear evidence of serious problems which he said he >had discussed over the last two weeks with his superiours. He >admitted that I had every right to be concerned, but was certain that the >FBI would be unable to do anything at all --since they had to ask the >very person responsible for the fraud for permission to investigate! > >Neither he nor his bosses were so naive as to believe this request >would be permitted. Please note: there are agents of the government >who can committ serious crimes--in this case sedition, i.e., >undermining the constitutional provisions for separation of >powers--and get clean away with it. You must be talking to a very junior FBI agent. because there are lots of ways to remedy this problem. First, presentation of the evidence to the clerk of the court. They can send the information to the judge, who can convene a contempt hearing, and have information developed by US Marshals, the FBI under order and release of US Attorneys files. THe Judge can also complain to the justice dept office of professional responsibility or the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division or The Inspector General of the DOJ. The evidence can also be presented to the Chief judge of the district, and these old men are not to be messed with. They are life Lords of the bench, and unlikely to Like a political appointee of the Clinton administration acting out of line. The third course is to call the Congressional over-sight commision. They can have the GAO investigate as well as hold hearings, and wouldn't the republican senators like to stick it to Janet Reno. The fourth course is to send the information to Jack Anderson. he's always good for a red hot pin to the eyeball. ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 23 May 1994 11:00:26 -0400 (EDT) From: Stanton McCandlish Subject: File 9--Ontario Provincial Police harass Internet Users Date--Fri, 20 May 1994 22:00:16 -0400 (EDT) From--[anonymous EFF member] Note: due to the current political climate in Ontario, please do not forward this story over the net with my name on it. Reading the story will explain why. There is increasing evidence that with in the next two years we may see in Canada a similar situation as has been taking place in Italy over the last few weeks with the shutting down of 'amature' BBS sites. As reported in Toronto's EYE Newspaper [eye@io.org] (similar to New Yorks Village Voice) dated May 19. 1994 The London Ontario detachment of the Ontario Provincial Police have begun a campaign of harassment against local University Internet users who are attempting to use the 'net to gain information on the Karla Homolka trial. A University of Western Ontario (London) student had his Internet account frozen by the university computer staff when requested by the Police. The reason for this lay in the student's name being left on the text of a FAQ of the details of the trial. Another student in Toronto had Faxed this material (which had been Emailed to him) to the Toronto media, and the offices of the Premier of Ontario and the Attorney-General as an act of provocation against the Ban (his regular anonymous forwarding site was not working).The problem was that he had forgotten to remove the other persons name and account number from the original E-mail that was sent out. The police action against the student's account was done without a warrant, and also involved the questioning of the student at the local police station. Likewise the students home computer was searched without a warrant by using the threat of criminal charges. The Student's computer account was re-instated, but he was required to turn over all incoming Email to the police under the threat of criminal charges if he did not cooperate. A list of about 50 people who had received Homolka FAQ's were passed on to the police. The important part of this entire situation is that no one, including the Ontario Attorney-General office is certain that the ban applies to the Internet. The ban states that details of the trial cannot be published in the print media but there is no ban on possession of information. There is no mention of the Internet, nor the use of computer systems in the ban. Further, there is no official investigation of the Internet on the part of the Ontario Provincial Police, except for this one detachment. One of the questions raised is the ethics of the University of Western Ontario's computer department. Their cooperation with the police was based on a fear of having their computer equipment confiscated (similar to the case of the University of Cambridge in England). If the situation had taken place with in the library system of the university, it would not have been tolerated by the library staff due to the long held tradition in that profession of the defence of freedom of speech. If the Internet is to remain open this set of values will have to become part of the professional comittment of the MIS staff of universities as well. ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 14 May 1994 00:35:37 -0400 (EDT) From: email list server Subject: File 10--RSI Network Newsletter Typing and mousing injuries are becoming a serious problem. Maybe your organization can help build awareness among computer users. Consider joining the the RSI Network Newsletter. It is a free publication, distributed over Internet once every two months, with occasional supplements. Since it is a moderated list, the traffic amounts to about 20K/month on average. We have changed from a manually managed subscription list to an automated one, so I feel better about advertising the RSI Network Newsletter's existence to a wider group. The RSI Network Newsletter covers all topics of interest to people with arm, hand, wrist, shoulder injuries from typing, or people who have to cope with computers even though they have an injury of this sort. A Topics Index follows. Issue 17 came out in early May and Issue 18 will be out by the end of June. I edit and publish the electronic version on Internet, pro bono. Please feel free to repost or redistribute this message. You may subscribe as an individual, or subscribe a list at your organization. Back issues are widely available by Gopher and FTP. Please Email me directly for more information on back issues. Getting On the List: subscribing -------------------------------- Send a mail message to: majordomo@world.std.com The Subject doesn't matter. Put this into the body of your message just as it appears here: subscribe rsi Getting Off the List: unsubscribing ----------------------------------- Send a mail message to: majordomo@world.std.com The Subject doesn't matter. Send the message: unsubscribe rsi ...COD -- Craig O'Donnell | Editor, RSI Network Newsletter on Internet dadadata@world.std.com | Author of Cool Mac Sounds (Hayden 1993) ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 23 May 94 17:57:44 EDT From: mcmullen@PHANTOM.COM(John F. McMullen) Subject: File 11--Special Issue on Electronic Communication and Sociology Special Issue on Electronic Communication and Sociology The American Sociologist invites submissions for a special issue to be titled "Electronic Communication and Sociology." Papers should deal with issues surrounding electronic communication and its implications for sociology--both good and bad. Electronic communication is broadly conceived both technologically and socially. It includes Email, local area networks, modems, faxes, wireless communications, BITNET, the INTERNET, multimedia, commercial networks and services such as Prodigy and CompuServe, telecommuting, distance learning, research collaboration at a distance, sociological studies of electronic communication, using electronic communication to access scholarly resources and datasets, electronic journals, reader lists, bulletin boards, remote access to computers and resources, cyberspace, on-line conferencing, fax-on-demand, and telephony. Topics might include but are not limited to the following: - Implications of electronic communication for distance learning, extension, and outreach - How BITNET and the INTERNET are changing research in sociology - How sociological practice is changing due to electronic communication - Research opportunities afforded by electronic communication - Integrating electronic communication & multimedia into the sociology curriculum - How will electronic communication change social life? - Using local area networks to collect data and conduct social psychological experiments - Electronic communications as a data source for sociological research - Invisible colleges in the electronic age - Security and privacy issues in distributed data - Problems with electronic communication including threats to productivity - Weighing electronic publications and other computer-based work in the tenure decision - Resources on the INTERNET and their implications for sociological research and teaching - The role of sociologists in public policy formation regarding the information superhighway - What should the ASA and other professional associations do to take advantage of electronic communication in the discipline? Submit four copies of your paper, in TAS style, before March 1, 1995, to either special-issue coeditor: Edward Brent Edward Mirielli Department of Sociology Idea Works, Inc. University of Missouri 607 Jackson Street Columbia, MO 65211 Columbia, MO 65203 SOCBRENT@MIZZOU1 RUSOEDM@MIZZOU1 FAX: (314) 875-5812 FAX: (314) 875-5812 Voice: (314) 882-9172 Voice: (314) 875-5827 ------------------------------ End of Computer Underground Digest #6.45 ************************************