<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><> /* *\ / * * \ / * * \ / * * \ / * System Vulnerabilities * \ | * * | | * * | | * * | | * Another Modernz Presentation * | | * * | \ * by * / \ * Multiphage * / \ * * / \ * (C)opyright May 25th, 1992 * / \ * */ ********************************************************* <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><> ******************************************************************************* The Modernz can be contacted at: MATRIX BBS WOK-NOW! World of Kaos NOW! World of Knowledge NOW! St. Dismis Institute - Sysops: Wintermute Digital-demon (908) 905-6691 (908) WOK-NOW! (908) 458-xxxx 1200/2400/4800/9600 14400/19200/38400 Home of Modernz Text Philez <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>< <*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*> <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><> TANSTAAFL Pheonix Modernz The Church of Rodney - Sysop: Tal Meta (908) 830-TANJ (908) 830-8265 Home of TANJ Text Philez <*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*> CyberChat Sysop: Hegz (908)506-6651 (908)506-7637 300/1200/2400/4800/9600 14400/19200/38400 Modernz Site TLS HQ <><><><><><><><><><><><><><<><<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>< The Global Intelligence Center World UASI Headquarters! Pennsylvania SANsite! (412) 475-4969 300/1200/2400/9600 24 Hours! SysOp: The Road Warrior <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>< The Lost Realm Western PA UASI site! Western PA. SANfranchise (412) 588-5056 300/1200/2400 SysOp: Orion Buster <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>< The Last Outpost PowerBBS Support Board UASI ALPHA Division NorthWestern PA UASI site! (412) 662-0769 300/1200/2400 24 hours! SysOp: The Almighty Kilroy <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>< Hellfire BBS SANctuary World Headquarters! New Jersey UASI site! (908) 495-3926 300/1200/2400 24 hours! SysOp: Red <*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*> BlitzKreig BBS Home of TAP (502)499-8933 <*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*><*> I. Description The Michelangelo virus is a computer virus that affects PCs running MS-DOS (and PC-DOS, DR-DOS, etc.) versions 2.xx and higher. Note, however, that although the virus can only execute on PCs running these versions of DOS, it can infect and damage PC hard disks containing other PC operating systems including UNIX, OS/2, and Novell. Thus, booting an infected DOS floppy disk on a PC that has, for example, UNIX on the hard disk would infect the hard disk and would probably prevent the UNIX disk from booting. The virus infects floppy disk boot sectors and hard disk master boot records (MBRs). When the user boots from an infected floppy disk, the virus installs itself in memory and infects the partition table of the first hard disk (if found). Once the virus is installed, it will infect any floppy disk that the user accesses. Some possible, though not conclusive, symptoms of the Michelangelo virus include a reduction in free/total memory by 2048 bytes, and some floppy disks that become unusable or display "odd" graphic characters during "DIR" commands. Additionally, integrity management products should report that the MBR has been altered. Note that the Michelangelo virus does not display any messages on the PC screen at any time. II. Impact The Michelangelo virus triggers on any March 6. On that date, the virus overwrites critical system data, including boot and file allocation table (FAT) records, on the boot disk (floppy or hard), rendering the disk unusable. Recovering user data from a disk damaged by the Michelangelo virus will be very difficult. III. Solution Many versions of anti-virus software released after approximately October 1991 will detect and/or remove the Michelangelo virus. This includes numerous commercial, shareware, and freeware software packages. Since this virus was first detected around the middle of 1991 (after March 6, 1991), it is crucial to use current versions of these products, particularly those products that search systems for known viruses. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- =========================================================================== Internet Intruder Activity --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Information regarding a significant intrusion incident on the Internet. Systems administrators should be aware that many systems on the Internet have been compromised due to this activity. To identify whether your systems have been affected by the activity we recommend that all system administrators check for the signs of intrusion detailed in this advisory. This advisory describes the activities that have been identified as part of this particular incident. This does not address the possibility that systems may have been compromised due to other, unrelated intrusion activity. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- I. Description The intruders gained initial access to a host by discovering a password for a user account on the system. They then attempted to become root on the compromised system. II. Impact Having gained root access on a system, the intruders installed trojan binaries that captured account information for both local and remote systems. They also installed set-uid root shells to be used for easy root access. III. Solution A. Check your systems for signs of intrusion due to this incident. 1. Check the su, ftpd, and ftp binaries (for example, "/bin/su", "/usr/ucb/ftp" and "/usr/etc/in.ftpd" on Sun systems) against copies from distribution media. 2. Check for the presence of any of the following files: "/usr/etc/..." (dot dot dot), "/var/crash/..." (dot dot dot), "/usr/etc/.getwd", "/var/crash/.getwd", or "/usr/kvw/..." (dot dot dot). 3. Check for the presence of "+" in the "/etc/hosts.equiv" file. 4. Check the home directory for each entry in the "/etc/passwd" file for the presence of a ".rhosts" file containing "+ +" (plus space plus). 5. Search the system for the presence of the following set-uid root files: "wtrunc" and ".a". 6. Check for the presence of the set-uid root file "/usr/lib/lpx". B. Take the following steps to secure your systems. 1. Save copies of the identified files to removable media. 2. Replace any modified binaries with copies from distribution media. 3. Remove the "+" entry from the "/etc/hosts.equiv" file and the "+ +" (plus space plus) entry from any ".rhosts" files. 4. Remove any of the set-uid root files that you find, which are mentioned in A5 or A6 above. 5. Change every password on the system. 6. Inspect the files mentioned in A2 above for references to other hosts. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------