sPHeAr ------ __ ___ __ ___ / / / / / / /\ / / \ /__/ /__/ /__ /__\ /__/ __/ / / / /__ / / / \ DigiZine Phreaking Hacking Anarchy (And AnyThing Else P/H/A/C/C/V) Editor: Signal Co-Editor: Mustang File Contributions: John Deere Signal sPHeAr can be reached at system1x@axposf.pa.dec.com Issue #1 [01.28.94] Contents -------- Articles -+-+-+-+ RedBox Dangers Operator Operations Our Fuckin' Rights Toll Fraud Philes +-+-+- NewHack.Zip Sneakers.Zip RedBox Dangers -------------- by Signal All real phreakers know that a redbox is a great tool, if used wisely. Redboxes can be used to make both local and LD calls. However, as we know, to make a local call, one must first dial '0' and then make up some excuse like 'excuse me operator, the 5 button on this payphone doesn't seem to be working.' The TSPS operator would ask you to deposit 25 cents and dial then dial the number for you. Normally you don't need an excuse to have the operator dial a number for you. But in recent years the operators have become 'smarter' and aware of the rat shack tone-dialer conversion. Nowadays if you ask the operator to dial a number for you, for no apparent reason, he/she will become suspicious almost immediatly. Although they will place the call whether or not you give them a reason, the will be listening to you when you place the tones. Sometimes, I have discovered, that using a redbox to make local calls doesn't allways work, as I have had the operator inform me that the quarter was not registering and that I was using an electronic device. The operator then said that she was going to call security and to please wait on the line. I think you can guess what I did then. I have never had a problem dialing long distance though. This is probably because it is automated when it asks for your money. The main reason that the operator will suspect that you are using a redbox is if the tones generated are too loud, as this somehow impairs the TSPS's ability to detect the quarter tones. The quarter tones generated by the phone are usually much quieter than that of the red box. To get around this problem, hold a credit card, or piece of thin cardboard between the redbox and the mouthpiece. This should significantly reduce the loudness. Another reason for the operator knowing that you are using an 'electronic device' is that the speed of the tones produced by the redbox, often times do not match the speeds of the phone; the redbox tones are slightly, but noticably slower. There is no real solution to this type of problem, oh well, there are other phones out there. Operator Operations ------------------- by Signal 'Hello C&P telephone, may I help you?' We all know that TSPS operators are one of the most dangerous around. But is life as an operator really that interesting. When you come to think about it, you realize that although it would be great to be an operator, think about all the potential drawbacks. If you have ever taken a tour of either an AT&T switching station, or a Bell station, you know that operators don't have the best 'offices' around. Personally operators must have the most routine, and probably one of the most boring jobs around. Since the late 1980s almost all switching tasks are performed by computer, there is really no need to have a human operator. The operator's primary task is to oversee the computer and to take anycalls regarding collect calls, and billing. Even with collect calls, this is now handled by computer, where you dial 0+NPA+Nxx+xxxx and a voice recording will ask you for your name. Basically the TSPS operators exist to make operator-assisted calls. TSPS operators are so dangerous because they have an ANI readout display and are known sometimes to monitor operator-assisted calls. So is becoming an operator really a career choice? Our Fuckin' Rights ------------------ by Signal Ever realize that the government has so much control it isn't even funny anymore? Just for an example, take the 2600 incident in November 1992 at Pentagon City. As described by both the Washington Post and 2600 Magazine, the Secret Service agents that raided the meeting took disks, computer equipment, and other material without informing the people of what was happening. They also took the IDs of the people there with out any stated reasons. This act alone shows that the government has so much control over our lives, and that the Constitution doesn't offer as much protection as it seems it does. It is not in this century alone that the Constitution did not guarantee us our rights, as we can see. The government, since it is also composed of the Judicial branch can restrict our rights, and in some cases deny them to us and still get away with it. Toll Fraud ---------- Excerpt from the FCC Notice for Proposed Rulemaking, CC Docket 93-292 {Talks about how the FCC is fighting it. Doesn't talk about redboxes.. just beige boxing, and blue boxing, etc.} Until the mid 1980s, carrier networks were the main targets of telecommunications fraud. Fraud perpetrators might use electronic devices or even a child's whistle to simulate carrier switching tones that would allow them to place calls and avoid paying for them. As carriers developed new methods to prevent these primitive forms of toll fraud, however, perpetrators began to use computers to access the carriers' networks. Control over the use of telecommunications services has increasingly shifted from carriers to individual consumers. Technology is providing more flexible options for use of those services. With this shift in control, however, has come a shift in the toll fraud targets. Customers, as well as carriers, are now the victims. Fraud involving customer-owned private branch exchanges (PBXs) provides an example. Customers can now use a feature in their on-premises PBX equipment to route incoming remote access calls to an outgoing line. With this capability, a company's sales representatives in the field can, for example, have the convenience of placing calls that would be billed to the employer's outgoing PBX line. Fraud perpetrators have discovered that they can call into a PBX and then use computers or "finger hacking" to identify the authorization code for the remote access feature connected to the outgoing line. Once the authorization code is found or "hacked," the perpetrator can obtain a dial tone and make outgoing calls that are billed to the PBX owner. In some cases, the PBX owner may also be billed for incoming 800 calls made by the perpetrator. Both customers and carriers suffer the effects of fraud; industry and Secret Service estimates of annual losses range from one to five billion dollars, in an industry in which annual billings are approximately $175 billion. Several different types of fraud are creating these losses: (1) the unauthorized remote access through PBXs already described; (2) cellular "cloning," in which billing codes for legitimate cellular subscribers are installed in a perpetrator's cellular phones; (3) the billing of operator-assisted calls to line with billing restrictions, such as payphone lines; and (4) "clip-on" fraud, in which the perpetrator physically attaches a calling device directly to a phone line. Fraud perpetrators may watch customers using calling cards at payphones and sell the calling card numbers to others, or directly approach consumers and ask them to accept billing to their phones as part of a spurious "official" investigation. Industry and law enforcement sources expect that new types of fraud will develop even as these existing types of fraud are being combatted. Experience has shown that those new telecommunications technologies offering the most convenience and flexibility for users, are often also most likely to present new toll fraud opportunities. The Commission's goal has been, and will continue to be, to work with consumers and the industry to find solutions to each fraud problem without hindering the development or use of these new technologies. In devising these solutions, we must ensure that telecommunications equipment and services remain accessible. The Commission is not charged with enforcing criminal statutes or prosecuting toll fraud perpetrators. The Department of Justice, local law enforcement agencies, and the U. S. Secret Service are among the agencies charged with the enforcement of criminal statutes. Nevertheless, the Commission has taken several steps toward developing solutions to toll fraud. First, the Commission issued a series of "Consumer Alerts" describing the dangers posed by telecommunications fraud and steps that can be taken to detect and prevent it. Second, on October 9, 1992, we convened an _en banc_ hearing on Toll Fraud. Panelists representing telecommunications consumers, carriers, equipment vendors, insurance providers, and law enforcement agencies presented diverse perspectives and detailed proposals for detection, prevention, and responsibility. (See Appendix B) Following the hearing, the Commission encouraged further comment by holding the record on toll fraud open until November 16, 1992. Third, the Commission has taken action in related proceedings to address toll fraud concerns. In July 1992, in the operator service rulemaking proceedings, the Commission required local exchange carriers to offer services, to reduce payphone providers' and other aggregators' exposure to toll fraud. Earlier, in 1990, the Commission adopted standards for direct inward dial (DID) calls which required answer supervision on DID calls routed back to the public switched network by a PBX. This amendment of Part 68 of the Commission's rules was initiated because carriers were losing tens of millions of dollars of revenue in cases where PBXs failed to return an answer supervision signal to the central office, notifying it of a billable call. The Commission continues to resolve formal and informal complaints that raise toll fraud issues. The Commission also coordinates with industry, consumers, vendors, and law enforcement agencies. Commission staff attends meeting with industry groups working to formulate prospective solutions to toll fraud problems. Some fraud issues appear to have been resolved by the industry, including, for example, dial tone reorigination, which permits the calling party to receive a second dial tone after the original call is terminated. The industry also has implemented intercompany cooperation on live call tracing. Many carriers have recently responded to the widespread concerns about toll fraud by offering services designed to provide early detection and prevention of the problems. It does not appear, however, that private action can resolve all toll fraud problems or that incentives to control fraud are structured in the best possible way. For example, the recent "Chartways" formal complaint proceeding presented the issue of liability for charges associated with unauthorized calls. Chartways, the complainant, was a private branch exchange (PBX) owner. It learned from AT&T that an unusual volume of calls to Pakistan was originating at its PBX. A subsequent investigation revealed that the calls were apparently being routed through the remote access feature of the PBX. Although Chartways informed AT&T that the calls were unauthorized, AT&T maintained that Chartways was liable for the related charges under the general payment obligation of AT&T's tariffs. Chartways responded by filing a formal complaint against AT&T with the Commission. The complaint alleged that AT&T's attempt to collect the charges was unreasonable and discriminatory, thus violating sections 201(b) and 202(a) of the Communications Act. The Common Carrier Bureau denied the complaint based on a largely stipulated record, and following the same analysis we denied Chartways' application for review of the Bureau decision. First, we found that the Bureau was correct in determining that the tariff provisions at issue were clear and definite in requiring payment for the calls, in that the tariff provisions recognized no exception to the general payment obligation for unauthorized usage. Next we affirmed the fining that Chartways had control over the disputed calls. We noted that Chartways had stipulated that it had "the capability to restrict access to and egress from its PBX" at all times. Moreover, while the record contained no evidence that AT&T was negligent in any way with regard to the unauthorized calls, it also showed that Chartways had taken no steps available to it to detect or prevent unauthorized calling through its PBX. Finally, we agreed that AT&T's practices in this case were not discriminatory when compared to its liability limits on unauthorized calling card using because calling card liability is controlled explicitly by a specific federal statute and related regulations. In _United Artists_, we examined the question of liability for charges associated with unauthorized calls that were either originated or accepted at the complainant's payphones. The threshold issue in the case was whether United Artists was AT&T's "customer," because only a "customer" who "orders" service could be held liable for charges under the terms of AT&T's tariff. We determined that the customer for the operator-assisted calls at issue was the caller or billed party, not United Artists, the owner of the payphones. We also found that United Artists did not presubscribe its payphone lines to AT&T for direct-dialed service. We then looked at whether United Artists had otherwise ordered service from AT&T, stating that if United Artists "had failed to take steps to control unauthorized operator-assisted and direct-dialed calling and had, instead, installed its phones in such a way as to allow callers to charge such calls to its payphone lines, [United Artists] could reasonably be held to have constructively 'ordered' service from AT&T, thus establishing an inadvertent carrier- customer relationship." The record showed that United Artists had adopted a number of measures designed to control potentially fraudulent calling. For example, it told the local exchange carrier, New York Telephone (NYT), that its lines were to have no primary interexchange carrier at all. It also ordered originating line and billed number screening services from NYT, which were intended to inform operator service providers such as AT&T of any billing restrictions on those lines. In addition to such preventative steps, United Artists also monitored calling from its phones and regularly reported any apparently fraudulent calling to NYT and AT&T. Based on the record, we concluded that United Artists did not intentionally or constructively order service from AT&T and therefore could not be held liable as a customer for the disputed charges. Philes -+-+-+ NewHack.Zip ----------- by John Deere Discription: compares old /etc/passwd file to a newer version of /etc/passwd and filters out differences. 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